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FAULTLESS DISMISSAL: ASSESSING THE SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
IN DISMISSAL FOR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The recognition of operational requirements as a ground for dismissal originates from 
ILO Convention 158.1 In its general survey of Recommendation 119 of 1963,2  the 
Convention’s predecessor, the International Labour Organisation’s Committee of 
Experts noted that reasons for dismissal relating to the operational requirements of the 
undertaking were generally defined by reference to redundancy or reduction in the 
number of posts for economic or technical reasons, or due to force majeur or accident. 
The above instrument3 recognises the right of employers to terminate the service of 
employees when operational requirements so require subject to certain provisos.4 
Under the present Constitution,5 South Africa is obliged to give effect to this and other 
ILO Conventions.6 It is stated in the current Labour Relations Act (LRA) that ‘any person 
applying this Act must interpret its provisions in compliance with the public international 
law obligations of the Republic.’7 Such interpretation and compliance is necessary 
                                                            
1 Termination of Employment Convention 158 of 1982. 
2 ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation 119 of 1963. 
3 Convention 158 of 1982. 
4 Article 4 of Convention 158. 
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6 Section 39.  
7 Section 3 (c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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because ‘it serve as important benchmarks for evaluating whether South Africa is in 
conformity with international standards.’8 
Section 188 of the current LRA distinguishes three broad categories of reasons for 
which an employer may dismiss namely, misconduct, incapacity and the operational 
requirements of the employer. 
The LRA defines the notion of ‘operational requirements’ to mean ‘requirements based 
on the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer.’9 The Code 
of Good Practice: Dismissal based on Operational Requirements,10 elaborates as 
follows:  
  As a general rule, economic reasons are those that relate to the financial management of 
the enterprise. Technological reasons refer to the introduction of new technology that 
affects work relationships either by making existing jobs redundant or by requiring 
employees to adapt to the new technology or a consequential restructuring of the 
workplace. Structural reasons relate to the redundancy of posts consequent to a 
restructuring of the employer’s enterprise.11 
‘Similar needs’ is an extremely broad concept which must be determined with regards to 
the circumstances of each case. Since the existence of such a reason is a factual 
question, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of what constitute ‘similar reasons’ 
for dismissal.12 The similar needs of an employer ‘would seem to be restricted to 
grounds akin to economic, technological and structural reorganisation of the 
                                                            
8 Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier “International Standards” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to 
Social Security 179. 
9 Section 213.  
10 GN 1517 Government Gazette 20254 of 16 July 1999, item (1). 
11 For examples of dismissals under such circumstances, see TAGWU v SA Stevedores (1993) 14 ILJ 
1068 (IC); FAWU v Kellog SA (1993) 14 ILJ 406 (IC); Associated Biscuits (a division of National Brands 
Ltd) v Mumsamy (1997) 9 BLLR 1121 (LAC); Du Toit D, Bosch C, Woolfrey D et al Labour Relations Law: 
A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) 423. 
12 Basson A, Christianson M, Garbers C et al Essential Labour Law 2ed (2000) 194. 
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enterprise’.13 Common to the circumstances in which the law permits employers to 
dismiss for operational requirements, is that they all justify, in economic terms, a 
reduction in the workforce.14 
For a wide variety of reasons an employer may find itself in a situation where it faces 
financial ruin.  Management may have resorted to an unsound strategy, large clients or 
contracts may have been lost or there may even be factors in the economy at large that 
places pressure on employers. A shift in exchange rates or in international oil prices 
may have a pronounced impact on certain types of operations.15  
The definition of operational requirements under section 213 of the LRA is itself very 
broad, but ‘its remit certainly includes a dismissal accessioned by a drop in productions, 
the introduction of a new technology or work programs, and the reorganisation of work 
and the restructuring of a business.’16 The background to this, Du Toit explains, is ‘the 
fiercely competitive climate in which many businesses, exposed to the full force of 
global economic pressures, find themselves, giving rise to the need for constant 
adaptation and conversely, the specter of dismissal for many employees.’17 
Consequent to this tough, but uncertain, commercial climate is the quest for survival, 
continuity and profit. Basson suggested therefore that: 
 Under pressure, the employer may be forced into considering reducing its wage bill- the 
total remuneration to all employees. Alternatively, an employer may consider restructuring 
its organisation - some organisations restructure fluidly and rapidly to meet changing 
                                                            
13 CIWU v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 11 BLLR 1080 (LAC) at para 57. See, Du Toit D, Bosch C, Woolfrey D 
et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) 423. 
14 Grogan J Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices 2ed (2007) 426. 
15 Basson AC  Essential Labour Law 4ed (2005) 146. 
16 Van Niekerk A ‘Unfair Dismissal’  2ed (2004) 74. 
17 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirements Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 595. 
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circumstances (such as new competitors entering the market); in other organisations a 
restructuring may mean that some employees lose their place in the organisational 
structure. Taking a longer term view, an employer may opt to invest heavily in advanced 
technology requiring fewer and fewer employees to control and operate this technology.18 
 
The definition of operational requirements in the LRA is quite clear at least in one 
respect – the reason for the dismissal is clearly not by virtue of any act or omission on 
the part of the employee, it is as a result of the needs of the employer.19 Some of these 
needs in operational requirements are mostly beyond the control of the employer. 
The employer’s needs under operational requirements must at least be distinguished 
from the other two forms of dismissal: misconduct and incapacity. In the case of 
misconduct and incapacity, the dismissal is as a consequence of some deed or 
misdeed of the employee. The employee fails to comply with workplace rules or the 
employee is incapable of doing the work for which he or she is employed. In the case of 
operational requirements, the reason has its origin in the employer’s needs and 
requirements.20 Dismissal on this ground occurs despite the fact that employees who 
may have given all they have and all they can into a business and are still willing to 
render more services within their capabilities are retrenched without any fault of their 
own. This is a ‘no-fault dismissal’ and the termination of employment in this situation is 
commonly called retrenchment.21 
In dismissal for operational requirement therefore, ‘it is the employer’s exigencies rather 
than any act or omission on the part of the employee that causes the termination of 
                                                            
18 Basson AC Essential Labour Law 4ed (2005) 146. 
19 Grogan J Workplace Law 7ed (2003) 196. 
20 Grogan J Workplace Law 10ed (2009) 270. 
21 Grogan J Workplace Law 10ed (2009) 270. 
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employment’,22 but regretfully the multiplier effect of the termination of employment of 
this kind goes beyond affected employees as the hardship extends to their dependants. 
The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal based on Operational Requirement ‘reiterates 
the categorisation of such dismissals as a species of “no fault” dismissals and states 
that, for this reason the LRA places particular obligations on an employer, ‘most of 
which are directed towards ensuring that all possible alternatives to dismissal are 
explored and that these employees are treated fairly’.23  In the other two categories of 
dismissal namely incapacity and misconduct, the employer has in most cases a sound 
legal standing to justify the dismissal of a guilty employee because the employee has 
maybe failed to comply with workplace rules or the employee is incapable  of doing the 
work for which he or she was employed.24  But the burden of establishing the fairness of 
an operational requirement dismissal becomes a daunting task for an employer. 
According to Grogan,  
The tension between the drive for profit and the obligation to honour contractual 
commitments to employees may create conflict because changes that are viewed by 
management as necessary for business efficiency or even for the survival of the enterprise 
may be unacceptable to affected employees and their representatives who may view 
proposed changes as attempts to increase the company’s profitability at their expense.25 
Since the consequences of operational requirements dismissal are quite grave on 
affected employees, and labour in general, due to the hardship that comes with 
unemployment, many countries require that retrenchment ‘should not be resorted to 
                                                            
22 Van Niekerk A Unfair Dismissal 2ed (2004) 72. 
23 Du Toit D, Bosch C, Woolfrey D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) 423. 
24 Basson AC Essential Labour Law 4ed (2005) 146. 
25 Grogan J Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices 2ed (2007) 426. 
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until the employer has complied with certain procedural requirements intended to 
minimise the impact on employees and their dependants.’26 For this reason therefore,  
The law is more prescriptive, in terms of both substance and procedure, than in the case of 
dismissal for misconduct or incapacity. If there is any discernible purpose to this 
prescription, it is to effect a balance between the promotion of the social good of preserving 
employment and the preservation of the efficiency of the employer’s enterprise.27 
In South Africa, the LRA promotes this purpose ‘by creating the structures that permit 
affected employees and their representatives to participate in decisions that are taken 
about proposed dismissal and its consequences.’28 
In allowing employers to dismiss in operational requirement circumstances, on the one 
hand, and in the same vein allowing employees or their representatives to participate in 
a joint consensus seeking process, Thompson and Benjamin wrote that:  
The statute set out to promote two immediate objects and one indirect one: Firstly, to avoid 
if possible the need to retrench at all (on the expectation that constructive dialogue may 
produce other solutions); secondly, to minimise the extent and impact of any dismissals 
that do occur; and thirdly, to help maintain reasonable relations between the employer, its 
employees and their representatives through what is inevitably a testing time.29 
In fact, sections 189 and 189A of the LRA30 ‘prescribe the procedures to be followed by 
an employer intending to dismiss on the basis of its operational requirement and 
determine the extent of interference by the Labour Court and collective bargaining with 
the employer’s substantive decisions to dismiss.’31  
Operational requirements dismissal is assessed on the fairness of substance and 
procedure.32 The substantive component of operational requirements dismissal 
concerns the real reason for the dismissal and the procedural aspect of the dismissal 
                                                            
26 Grogan J Workplace Law 10ed (2009) 270. 
27 Van Niekerk A Unfair Dismissal 2ed (2004) 72. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Thompson C & Benjamin P South African Labour Law (2006) 464.  
30 See below at 3.5.5.   
31 Van Niekerk A Unfair Dismissal 2ed (2004) 72. 
32 Section 188 of the LRA. 
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deals with the consultation of employees by the employer in making or effecting the 
dismissal decision. For the purpose of this mini-thesis, only the substantive fairness 
criteria in operational requirement dismissal will be assessed. To understand the 
position in this area of the law, this mini-thesis will assess the historical developments in 
this aspect of the law leading to the current Labour Relations Act of 1995 and its 
application by the courts. 
1.2 Research Question 
The research question to be answered is: Has the law on substantive fairness in 
dismissal for operational requirements reached equilibrium? Why has the various 
legislation and judicial decisions over the decades not created certainty in this area of 
the law? 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aims and objectives of this research are to: 
-   Assess substantive fairness in dismissal for operational requirements in South 
African labour law. 
-   Examine why the common law and the various statutory interventions have not 
succeeded to bring this area of the law into certainty. 
-    Examine the relevant case law and specific legislative provisions relevant to this 
form of dismissal and determine whether they fell short of achieving a consistent 
approach to the question of the substantive fairness in dismissal for operational 
requirements.  
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1.4 Rationale  
This study hopes to contribute in proposing ways to bring the law on substantive 
fairness in operational requirement dismissal to certainty and joins the effort in seeking 
a consistent approach to the question of substantive fairness in dismissal for operational 
requirements. This research is restricted to the law on substantive fairness in the 
dismissal for operational requirements in South Africa.  
1.5 Methodology 
In attempting to assess the substantive fairness in dismissal for operational 
requirements, this research will make use of the relevant legislation, judicial decisions, 
international law, books and academic articles in this area of the law.  
1.6 Chapter Outlines 
The outline of this research will be as follows: 
Chapter one 
Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter that introduces operational requirements as a 
ground permissible under South African law on dismissal. It limits the scope of the 
research to South African law. It sets out the research question, the aims and objectives 
of this research, the methodology that will be used in completing the research, the 
rationale of the research and the chapters outline of the mini-thesis. 
Chapter Two 
This chapter focuses on the historical development of the law on substantive fairness in 
operational requirement dismissal. It looks back to how the common law treated this 
form of dismissal and the limitations of the common law in this area. It examines the 
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statutory development of operational requirement dismissals and the jurisprudential 
progress in unfair dismissal in general and dismissal for operational requirements in 
particular. It assesses how the courts have applied the various statutory provisions 
relevant to operational requirement dismissals, but with emphasis on the substantive 
fairness in dismissal for operational requirements under the LRA. The focus on the 
history of substantive fairness dismissal is important because it illustrates the ebb and 
flow of the two main approaches regarding the role of the courts in adjudicating disputes 
regarding the substantive fairness of dismissals for operational requirements. 
Chapter Three 
This chapter focuses on operational requirements under the current LRA. It examines in 
detail the meaning of operational requirements, the concept of fairness and the specifics 
of what may constitute the ‘similar needs’ of an employer33. It assesses the 2002 
amendment to the LRA in more detail, especially the changes brought in by section 189 
A and how the courts position has been shaped by this new provision and the impact of 
this amendment on the law on substantive fairness in the dismissal for operational 
requirements.  
Chapter Four 
Based on the findings in the previous chapters, this chapter will provide the conclusions 
and recommendations on how more certainty can be achieved regarding substantive 
fairness in dismissal for operational requirements.  
                                                            
33 The definition of operational requirements refers to economic, technological or structural or ‘similar 
needs’ of an employer-section 213. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON SUBSTANTIVE 
FAIRNESS IN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT DISMISSAL  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Operational requirement is one of the grounds of dismissal permissible in South African 
law in terms of section 188 of the LRA.34  Permissible as it is, this area of the law has 
attracted more controversy than the other categories of dismissal such as misconduct 
and poor work performance. The operational requirement of a business has been 
defined in terms of section 213 of the LRA as those based on the economic, 
technological, structural or similar needs of an employer. From the definition of 
operational requirements under section 213, it is clear that the reason for the dismissal 
must relate to the economic, technological or structural needs of the employer, or 
reasons similar to these. There must be an ‘economic rationale for the dismissal.’35  
The decision to dismiss employees for operational requirements is purely an economic 
one. How each employer reacts to salvage their business, reduce losses or increase 
profits, is a personal decision and varies from enterprise to enterprise. Todd & Damant 
are of the opinion that:  
One employer faced with a particular economic or operational circumstance might take one 
approach, while another might take a different approach. An employer will be presented at 
any one time with a whole range of different options and alternatives as to how best it may 
pursue the commercial or other interests of the business or enterprise. It may choose to 
                                                            
34 Act 66 of 1995. 
35 See Brand J, Lotter C, Mischke C et al Labour Dispute Resolution 3ed (2002) 229. 
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buy assets or sell assets, increase volume of production or reduce volumes of production, 
buy a factory or sell a factory, increase or decrease its prices, choose a new supplier.36  
The shifting nature of commerce and the need for businesses to adapt and adjust to the 
changing nature of the market place are summed up by Thompson & Benjamin when they 
emphasise that:  
…in a market driven economy, businesses thrive or wither on their capacity to adapt and 
compete overtime. Businesses that react well, survive; business that anticipate, prosper. 
The organisation that treads water, while perhaps profitable today, will be stretched and 
then outmaneuvered by more nimble competitors tomorrow. A legal bar on downsizing for 
those otherwise leveraging still greater efficiencies is simple not compatible with the 
dynamics of domestic and especially international markets, the more so given the mobility 
of capital.37  
It is suggested by Grogan that ‘the number of employees required by an employer to 
maintain production at the desired rate is an issue falling within the peculiar knowledge of 
management’,38 and this decision from the LAC seem to agree that: 
 [T]here can be no doubt that as a general rule an employer has the right to choose the 
way in which he will run his business provided that, in so far as workers are concerned, 
he…..consults with them or their representatives as contemplated by s189 of the Act....39  
Hence in making retrenchment decisions, it is generally accepted that managers running 
the day-to-day affairs of a business are ideally best placed to make its decisions and 
surely, the judges are not members of any business executive. Le Roux & Van Niekerk 
noted that ‘allowing the courts to enquire into the merits of management decisions would 
constitute an intrusion into managerial prerogative by an institution ill-qualified to do so.’40 
While Le Roux & Van Niekerk’s position here may be open to some questions, navigating 
the murky waters of managerial prerogative by the courts has seen some of the most 
inconsistent decisions in judgment history in this area of the law as judicial scrutiny 
                                                            
36 Todd C & Damant G ‘Unfair Dismissal-Operational Requirement’ (2004) 25 ILJ 905 at para 2.  
37 Thompson C & Benjamin P South African Labour Law (2006) 477. 
38 Grogan J Dismissal (2010) 341. 
39 Forecourt Express (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU and Others (2006) 27 ILJ 2537 (LAC) 2538E. 
40 Le Roux PAK & Van Niekerk A The SA Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 244. 
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embrace the ‘brutal realities’41 of the commercial world. Perhaps it is with this uncertainty 
in mind that Grogan took the view that ‘the courts enter this debate at their peril’42 and in 
the same vein, Du Toit stated that ‘it is improbable that courts will frequently be prepared 
to address questions of this nature, involving complex commercial calculations, purely on 
the basis of common sense or logic.’43 
These views notwithstanding, others have submitted to the contrary and suggested that 
even if management should run its business as it sees fit, the courts should intrude in 
those decisions given the gravity of such decisions on the lives of workers. Rycroft & 
Jordaan stated that: 
 The complex, but purely economic nature, of retrenchment decisions and its 
consequences to affected employees to an extent necessitated some judicial intrusion  in 
the battle between labour and capital and that perhaps ‘challenging the traditional 
employer perception that the size and character of the workforce is a matter entirely of 
managerial prerogative, is a growing refusal by workers to accept that retrenchment is the 
inevitable consequence of economic forces or technological change over which they have 
no control.44 
This chapter of the mini-thesis will consider the jurisprudential development before the 
introduction of the current LRA. It will focus on the common law, the development of 
statutory enactments and the role the courts have been playing in scrutinising the 
employer’s decision to dismiss for operational requirements from the previous Labour 
Relations Act of 1956 to the present Act in force today. 
One cannot understand this area of the law by just looking at its statutory history in 
isolation. The law of unfair dismissal has been in existence even before the introduction of 
statutory law governing specific aspects of labour law such as dismissal. Labour law, and 
                                                            
41 Thompson C ‘Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal’ (1999) 
20 ILJ 755 at 756.  
42 Grogan J Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices 2ed (2007) 426. 
43 Du Toit D, Bosch C, Woolfrey D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) 430.  
44 Rycroft A  & Jordaan B A Guide to South African Labour Law 2ed (1992) 230. 
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the law of unfair dismissal, in particular, was regulated and governed by the general 
principles of common law.45 It was perhaps the inadequacy of the common law to provide 
full and satisfactory answers in specific labour matters and in this case on the substantive 
aspects of operational requirement dismissal that necessitated the introduction and 
development of statutory provisions in this area of the law. The focus will now be shifted to 
the common law position in this area of the law, its shortcomings and statutory 
developments under South African labour law for which the English common law has been 
very influential.46  
2.2 The Common Law Position on Dismissal: An Overview 
Before the introduction of statutes in this area of the law, the law of dismissal was 
governed by the common law. The contract of employment generating the obligations 
and duties of both employee and employer like any other contract was governed to 
some extent by the general tenets or principles of general contract law. At common law 
the parties are in principle free to determine the terms of their relationship.47  The 
classical view of contract was that the parties freely enter into an agreement or bargain 
as equals and therefore there should be as little state regulation or intervention as 
possible.48 Hence, the rendering of personal services came to be regarded as a ‘free 
exchange between individuals who are exerting their own free will over the letting and 
hiring of the worker’s services.’49  Pure contract doctrine came to be applied to the 
                                                            
45 Van Jaarsveld SR & Van ECK BPS Principles of Labour Law (1998) 2.  
46 Schreiner OD The Contribution of English Law to South African Law; And the Rule of Law in South 
Africa (1967) 10.  
47 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A Guide to South African Labour Law 2ed (1992) 36. 
48 Koffman L & Macdonald E The Law of Contract 3ed (1998) 3.  
49 Veneziani B ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment’ in Hepple (ed) The Making of Labour Law in 
Europe (1986) 32. 
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employment relationship with the development of the new social orders of the 17th and 
18th centuries and it became as Alan Fox has argued, ‘the essence of economic 
exchange’ and was regarded ‘as the mechanism which articulates atomistic, self-
regarding individuals into collaborative aggregates and linked processes necessary for 
civil society.’50 According to Veneziani,  
The ideology embodied in this description was that of freedom of contract i.e. the freedom 
of the employer and worker from the interference of the state in the labour market, the 
freedom of choice of the contracting parties and the freedom of private will to determine the 
content of the contract.51 
It was a concept of general application that if parties having the capacity to act enter 
into an agreement, that agreement in the absence of some factors such as fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, mistakes, becomes law between the 
contracting parties which courts of law must enforce. As Kessler has pointed out, 
‘rational behavior within the context of our culture is only possible if agreements will be 
respected. It requires that reasonable expectations created by promises receive the 
protection of the law.’52  The proper functioning of a contract once entered under the 
common law rests very firmly on the ability of the parties to bargain freely, and reach an 
understanding or meeting of the minds.53  A typical contract is ideally where there is free 
bargaining between parties who are brought together by the interplay of market forces 
and who meet each other in a footing of an equality of some sort.54  It was perhaps with 
this in mind that Sir George Jessel, MR made his famous dictum… 
If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age 
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
                                                            
50 Fox A A Sociology of Work in Industry (1971) 181. 
51 Veneziani B (1986) 37. 
52 Kessler F ‘Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43(5) Columbia 
Law Review  629. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Koffman L & Macdonald E The Law of Contract 3ed (1998) 3. 
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contract when entered into freely and voluntary shall be held sacred and shall be enforced 
by courts of justice.55 
Sir George Jessel MR was here enunciating the doctrine of the sanctity or freedom of 
contract which applied squarely in contracts of employment.  This dictum is important 
because freedom to contract and the respect of contractual obligation is very much 
present in the South African law of contract including employment contracts. According 
to Didcott J in Roffey v Catterall, Edward & Goudre,56  there is both a commercial and 
moral justification for the emphasis on the sanctity of contract: 
Commerce needs freedom to bargain and loyalty to contracts already concluded….But its 
mercantile justification is not all there is to be said for sanctity of contracts. The principle 
has a moral foundation too, which gives its durability and universality beyond the norms of 
the market place. This consists of the simple requirement that people should keep their 
promises. That appeal to honour surely transcends all else of present relevance.57 
The role of the court it can be said, during the dominant application of the common law, 
was mostly limited to interpreting the instrument which embodied the agreement of the 
parties. Koffman & Macdonald wrote that: 
It was not the task of the law to ensure that a fair bargain had been struck or to enquire 
whether the parties had in fact met as equals. This attitude was consistent with the laissez-
faire philosophy which was so influential in the thinking of the time; it was consistent with 
the idea that contracts should be made by the parties (with freedom of choice) and not 
imposed on them by the state. It was thought to be consonant with a free market economy 
and the spirit of competition.58 
 The court is not expected to make a contract for the parties. In other words, parties to a 
contract of employment have to agree on their condition or terms of employment and 
this agreement if freely entered, may not be varied in principle by the courts of law.59 As 
a species of contract, the contract of employment depends for its validity on compliance 
                                                            
55 Printing & Numeric Registering Co. v Sampson (1875) LR 19 EQ 462 at 465. 
56 Roffey v Catterall, Edward & Goudre`(1977) 4 SA 494 (N). 
57 At 505F-H. See also Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis (1984) (4) SA 874 at 892. 
58 Koffman L & Macdonald E The Law of Contract 3ed (1998) 3. 
59 Nassar N Sanctity of Contract Revisited (1995) 5. 
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with the normal contractual requirements of agreement, capacity to contract, possibility 
of performance, lawfulness and certainty, and nothing more.60 
Proponents of the common law doctrine of laissez-faire who argue against any 
interventionist approach by the courts and legislation in contractual matters contend that 
such intrusion will distort the interplay of market forces.61 The concerns of the 
proponents of minimal or no intervention by the courts and legislation in contractual 
matters, is summed up by Brassey in this lengthy but relevant quote:  
They say that litigation will have a bad effect on collective bargaining: instead of trying to 
sort out their differences for themselves, people will rush off to the courts, and the result 
will be acrimony and suspicion where there should be conciliation and compromise. 
Anyway, they say, the law is not equal to the task: it is too static, too unresponsive, 
ponderous and slow moving. It will be asked to regulate relationships, on the factory floor 
and at the bargaining table, that are continuous, mercurial and shot through with 
imponderables. It will also be asked to recreate the relationships when they break down. 
Can it really be expected to do these things by issuing pieces of official paper from its lofty 
perch? Can it order an employer to take back an employee it does not want or oblige to 
bargain in good faith? Can it really stop workers from going to strike, or order the 
community not to boycott an employer’s goods? And, for that matter, can it cope with the 
procedural difficulties that labour cases are prey to because of the number of people they 
involve and the complexity of their issues? The law, they say, must be kept out of this area; 
if it intervenes, it will fail, and then there will be harm done not merely to it but also to the 
parties who have come before it and to industrial relations generally.62 
Exponents of the sanctity of contract therefore, jealous of the liberty of the individual, 
believe that each individual knows best what is good for them, that the sum total of 
everyone pursuing their best interest uninhibited by courts or legislations, was the 
greatest good for the greatest number.  
Martin Brassey, writing back in 1987, believed that the common law served quite an 
important purpose. In commenting on the accomplishment of the common law in the 
field of employment law, Brassey took the view that: 
                                                            
60 Lende v Goldberg (1983) 2 SA 284 (C) 289. 
61 Brassey M, Cameron E, Cheadle H et al The New Labour Law: Strikes, dismissal and the unfair labour 
practice in South African Law (1987) 1. 
62 Ibid.  
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The answer is that it undoubtedly does to an extent. For instance, if the parties are silent 
on the matter, it implies into the contract an undertaking by the employees to work 
competently, faithfully and honestly, because this makes commercial sense. It likewise 
gives the average employee a right to payment for his services even though the parties 
may have come to no agreement on the matter; once again this makes commercial sense. 
In much the same spirit, it permits a party to bring the relationship to an end before the 
appointed time if its continuance has become impossible; and imports terms into the 
contract if this is necessary to give it-mark the language-business efficacy.63  
The perceived fairness of the common law that contracting parties are free to negotiate 
their own terms notwithstanding, it was beset by its own shortcomings which to a large 
extent resulted in statutory developments and intervention. 
2.3 The Limitations of the Common Law 
As discussed above, the common law position was that of freedom of contract with a 
limited role of the court mainly, to enforce the agreement in the event of a breach.  
2.3.1 Inequality of bargaining power 
The directives of the market place also postulate free and equal contracting parties 
negotiating at arm’s length. Haysom & Thompson observe that,  
contract doctrine embodies a particular conception of society-atomized and juridically equal 
individuals who enter relationships by striking a bargain on the terms of a contractual 
exchange. The important assumption is reciprocal exchange between equals.64 
This, Brassey writes, ‘conceals the fact of the employee’s dependence on the employer-
a dependence fortified by the employer’s power to terminate the relationship virtually at 
will.’65  
The employee is, as a rule, ‘not in a position to hold his or her own in determining the content 
of the relationship neither does he or she enjoy the same measure of freedom, as the employer 
                                                            
63 Ibid.  
64 Haysom N & Thompson C ‘Labouring Under the Law: South Africa’s Farm workers’ (1986) 7 ILJ 218 at 
221. 
65 Brassey M (1987) 3. 
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does, to exit from the relationship at will.’66  In fact, Beatty is of the opinion that employment 
is the only medium that employees can meaningfully cling for survival and that it might 
be close to impossible for them to exercise the will of exit. He wrote: 
 For them there is no meaningful alternative institution other than employment through 
which their labour can be made productive. For them access to this social institution 
represents nothing more than the means of survival. The possibility of exit, the traditional 
check on the abuse of market authority…is not realistically available.67  
Therefore, the inequality of the bargaining power between the contracting parties and 
perhaps the difficulty of the employee to exit the employment relationship was to an 
extent largely ignored by the classical theory of contract under the common law with its 
insistence on freedom or even sanctity of contract.  
In questioning the equality of the contracting parties in matters of employment and 
concluding that the parties to this contract are truly not as equal as the common law 
doctrine of freedom of contract perceived them to be, Davies & Freedland put it this 
way: 
His or her [the employee’s] lack of material resources, general immobility in the labour 
market, and the economic, personal and psychological value of work, makes the employee 
vulnerable to the employer’s power. In short, the power of the employer to withhold bread 
is a much more effective weapon than the power of the employee to refuse to work. Far 
from being the voluntary relationship it is claimed to be, the relationship is endowed with an 
involuntary, even coercive, character.68  
It is suggested that, by assuming the freedom of the parties to enter into the relationship 
and their equality in the making of the bargain, the market approach ensures that the 
content of the bargain is shielded from judicial supervision and interference.69 The law 
of contract, states Selznick, shows little interest in employer benevolence: 
                                                            
66 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A Guide to South African Labour Law 2ed (1992) 23. 
67 Beatty D ‘Labour is not a Commodity’ in Reiter B & Swan R Studies in Contract Law (1980) 333. 
68 Davies P & M R Freedland Kahn-Freud’s Labour and the Law 3ed (1983) 18. 
69 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A Guide to South African Labour Law 2ed (1992) 23. 
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It presumes that each party would take care of his own interest and provide for them in a 
freely bargained agreement. The limited moral commitment of the employer [justifies] any 
agreement he [may] impose. The terms of the arrangement would have to be relied on for 
substantive justice in the plant.70 
With the employer’s power of command and the employee’s concomitant subordination 
firmly in place ‘the court’s interpretation of the parties’ “intention” in such an 
“agreement”…frequently results in the consolidation of the superior…powers of the 
employer.’71 
The concept of unfair dismissal was, one may say, probably absent in the vocabulary of 
the common law since parties to the employment contract could bring it to an end 
without communicating the reasons for termination. Bringing an employment contract to 
an end without disclosing the reasons for such termination could not be fairness to 
either of the contracting parties especially the employee. The perceived equality of 
rights of the contractual parties ignored the gravity of the hardship to the employee in 
the sense that the right to terminate employment without reason is scarcely exercised 
by the employee. What was to be the equal rights of both contracting parties to bring the 
employment to an end without any notice, tends to be the right of the employer to 
dismiss at will while greatly diminishing the employee’s security of employment. The 
position of inequality of termination of employment is elaborated by Bennet when he 
wrote that:  
While both parties were believed to have had an equality of rights, it was only when one 
looked at the effect of that exercise of rights that one realized how unequal they really 
were. When the employee exercises his rights to end the contract, which seldom occurred, 
the detrimental effect on the employer would generally have been slight. In most cases, the 
employee would easily and quickly have been replaced. When the employer, on the other 
hand, exercised his rights to end the contract, the effect on the employee would generally 
have been disastrous. This is especially true in times of widespread unemployment, when 
                                                            
70 Selznick P Law, Society and Industrial Justice (1967) 137.  
71 Lord Wedderburn ‘Trust, Corporations and the Worker’ (1985) Osgoode Hall LJ 203 cited in Rycroft A & 
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the employee’s “equal” right to choose for whom he wished to work would be diminished, 
and in most cases non-existent.72 
The common law freedom of contract and perception of equality of the bargaining 
powers between the contracting parties in the field of employment actually led to 
inequality, particularly for the employee, and this shortcoming necessitated intervention. 
The situation was further complicated in South Africa before the advent of democracy in 
that losing their jobs had an adverse impact on where many employees were allowed to 
reside. Bennet summarised this position as follows: 
In South Africa, this inequality was increased by the fact that many workers, once they 
were dismissed, lost their rights to reside in the areas where they were most likely to find 
other jobs in terms of s10 (1) (d) of the now repealed Black (Urban Areas Consolidation) 
Act 25 of 1945. Once dismissals had to be justified, many employers took advantage of 
this loss of rights, knowing that it would have been extremely difficult for a dismissed 
worker to make a claim for reinstatement once he had been bussed back to his 
“homeland”.73  
 The purported equality of rights in employment under the common law regime was 
therefore a fallacy and as a consequence, the contracting parties were never equal and 
hence the need for statutory intervention. 
2.3.2 Employment relationship viewed in economic terms 
The second line of attack or shortcoming of the common law focuses on the judicial 
perception of the relationship in purely economic terms.74 The employees do not enjoy 
the freedom of withdrawal of labour because of the need for sustainability, dignity 
coupled with the difficulties in obtaining alternative employment whereas the employer 
can fairly terminate the employment contract with very little hassle of replacement.75    
 
                                                            
72 Bennet C  A Guide to the Law of Unfair Dismissal in South Africa (1992) 2. 
73 Ibid. 
74 UAMAWU v S Thompson (Pty) Ltd t/a Thompson Sheet Metal Works (1988) 9 ILJ (IC) 266 at 272D. 
75 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A Guide to South Africa Labour Law 2ed (1992) 23.  
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2.3.3 Sanctity of Contract 
The third shortcoming of the common law within the realm of dismissal law was the 
sanctity of contract doctrine or the strict adherence to contract. Hence, the courts 
operating under the common law adopted the view that it was not their place to make 
contracts for parties thereby limiting their roles solely to interpreting agreement between 
the contracting parties. In Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates76 it was argued that a 
provision in an employment contract should not be enforced because it bore 
oppressively on the employee. In finding that this argument must fail, De Villiers JA held 
inter alia: 
Even if it could be established that the stipulation is not in the interest of the 
workman,…[that] would not, apart from legislative enactment, be sufficient to justify the 
court in declaring the agreement freely entered into by the parties contra bonos mores. 
That would rather be a matter for the legislature.77 
The court found that it was not its place to make or negotiate contracts for the parties 
and that a contract freely entered into cannot be varied by the court however onerous 
and imbalanced that may be to either of the contracting party.78 In rejecting the 
aforementioned argument of the employee and stating that the irregularity of the 
contract cannot be rectified by the court and that it is a matter for the legislature, De 
Villiers JA was adhering to the sanctity of contract in total neglect of the inequality of the 
perceived equal parties to a contract. One may say therefore that as indispensable as 
the doctrine of the sanctity of contract was made to be during this era, its application 
was oppressive to employees and hence the need for legislation. 
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2.3.4 No reasons for termination required 
The fourth short-coming under the common law was that neither party is enjoined to 
give reasons to the other why the employment contract is terminated. According to 
Brassey ‘non-disclosure the reason for terminating a contract of employment has been 
seen as a common law right to be arbitrary about the procedure of dismissal.’79 Brassey 
continued: 
The common law… offers little protection against arbitrariness. It allows the party with the 
greater bargaining power to extract any bargain he wants, however oppressive, perverse 
or absurd it may be, provided that it is not illegal or immoral. It allows him to change it 
when it no longer suits him, by threatening to terminate the relationship unless the other 
party submits to the change. It allows him to flout the bargain whenever he likes, provided 
that he does not mind paying a paltry sum, which is invariably all the damages amount to. 
And all this he is allowed to do without consulting the other party first, or paying him the 
slightest heed.80  
The terminating party, therefore, was under no obligation to consult with the other party 
or his representatives on the reason for termination. Without the obligation to state 
reasons or consult an affected party before terminating an employment contract, the 
question of substantive and procedural fairness of a dismissal was foreign under the 
common law and the concept of unfair dismissal one can say to an extent was non-
existent. In rejecting the notion to consult an employee or its union representative 
before termination of employment, Ogilvie Thompson AJA stated that he was not aware 
of any authority which has applied the audi alteram partem principle to the field of 
contract and that ‘there certainly appear to be none that has applied it to the field of 
employment.’81 
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Thus, the courts have held that an employer has no obligation to afford an employee a 
hearing before deciding to dismiss him.82 Similarly, the employee is under no obligation 
to provide reasons to the employer as to why he is terminating his employment contract. 
The same will be true it seems, even if the obligation to hear, consult or negotiate is 
expressly imposed by the contract.83 The common law regards a term of this sort as ‘so 
vague as to its import, significance or consequence as to be unenforceable’.84 The 
vagueness, so it is said, lies in the fact that it confers on the party to whom it relates an 
absolute discretion to perform or not, as he chooses; by which is meant, presumably, an 
absolute discretion not merely on whether he will agree but also on how he will 
negotiate.85 
Summed up together, therefore, during the era of the sole prevalence of the common 
law, contracting parties were considered equal in the negotiation, conclusion and 
termination of the contract of employment. This contract, once entered, cannot be 
varied by a court of law, however onerous or oppressive any of the provision thereto 
can be to either of the contracting parties. In the event of a dispute before the court, the 
court was in no position to vary or alter any provision thereto and this was in pursuance 
of the doctrine of the sanctity of contract. Finally, either party to the contract was at 
liberty to bring the contract to an end without explanation as to why he elected 
termination. Hence, it is abundantly clear that if the parties to the contract are not in any 
obligation to consult an affected party, then the issue of procedural fairness or otherwise 
cannot be considered. The fact that any of the contracting parties can terminate the 
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83 Brassey M et al The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South 
African Law (1987) 5. 
84 SA Reserve Bank v Photocraft (1969) 1 SA 610 (C) 613G. 
85 Brassey M et al (1987) 5.  
 
 
 
 
24 
 
employment contract without advancing any reason thereto, left the issue of substantive 
and procedural fairness out of the dismissal equation. On these premises, one cannot 
speak of unfair dismissal during the exclusive prevalence of the common law. It is 
perhaps the shortcomings and inadequacies of the common law discussed above and 
their harsh consequences to employees that paved the way for the statutory 
development in this area of the law of unfair dismissal. Statutory intervention was clearly 
a necessity to address the inadequacy of the common law. Veneziani writes: 
The history of the contract of employment can be seen as the history of false aspiration. 
The promise of the freedom of contract in the employment relationship was never fully 
achieved. The freedom of the worker in the labour market was impeded by his social 
condition, that is, by his status. This statement holds true for both civil and common law 
countries. The transition from status to contract has been more apparent than real. It would 
be more accurate to say that in the various phases of the economic, social and political 
evolution of the employment relationship the worker’s status has changed.86 
The author was here certainly referring to the evolution of the status of the employee 
from the false equality under the freedom of contract era to a more positive state with 
the intervention of legislation.87   
2.4 Statutory Development of the Law of Unfair Dismissal with Specific Emphasis 
on Substantive Fairness 
The current LRA88 has a lengthy history of industrial legislation stretching back even to 
colonial times. In chronological order of statutory development, they are the Cape 
Servants Registry Act of 1906, the Transvaal Industrial Disputes Act of 1909, the Mines 
                                                            
86 Veneziani B ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment’ in Hepple B (ed) The Making of Labour Law 
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87 Writing back in the late 1990s, Koffman & Macdonald observed that ’[t]he law is a living and developing 
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and Works Act of 1911, the Factories Act of 1918, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
and the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953.  
 A century ago, the South African economy was exclusively agrarian and most people 
were employed at the farms or the country-side.89 The principles of the common law 
discussed above were adequate to regulate the relationship between the employer and 
the individual employees. However, the discovery of minerals resulted in great 
economic growth and industrial development.90 With the increase in population,  
[l]abour activities also expanded, resulting in the fact that relationships which regulated the 
rendering of services in the performance of work became more complicated. This made it 
imperative for the state to intervene towards the beginning of the last century, and to 
regulate labour relations by means of statutory enactments. The situation today is such 
that the collective labour relations between the employer and employee are regulated by a 
sophisticated system of statutory labour measures.91 
While it is true that the relationship between the employee and the employer has been 
described by the common law as one of confidence in the execution of contractual 
obligations, the common law approach in South Africa had begun changing by 1979.92 
According to Le Roux & Van Niekerk, ‘the rapid transformation from the common-law 
regulation of termination of employment to a jurisprudence of unfair dismissal at least 
equal to that in most market economies is perhaps the most remarkable feature of 
South African labour law reform.’93  What is even more remarkable is the fact that the 
jurisprudence was largely developed from an ‘amorphous statutory provision which 
nowhere referred to the words “termination of employment” or “dismissal” let alone the 
grounds on which a dismissal might be considered to be fair as opposed to lawful.’94  
                                                            
89 Van Jaarsveld SR & Van ECK BPS Principles of Labour Law (1998) 1. 
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However, it was not until 1979, when the government accepted the recommendation of 
the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation (better known as the Wiehahn 
Commission),95 that the way for the statutory introduction of the concept of unfair 
dismissal was paved.96  
While South Africa had withdrawn from the ILO in 1964, the Wiehahn Commission 
suggested that the country should attempt to use international recommendations, such 
as Recommendation 119 of 1963,97 as yardstick for its own labour legislation.98  
The unfair labour practice concept was introduced into the Labour Relations Act99 by the 
Industrial Conciliation Act100 following upon the recommendations of the Wiehahn 
Commission. The Industrial Conciliation Act established the Industrial Court and with it, 
the unfair practice jurisdiction emerged.101 The Act simply declared that an unfair labour 
practice was ‘any labour practice which in the opinion of the Industrial Court is an unfair 
practice.’102 
Although there was no express provision in the Act of the concept of unfair dismissal, it 
‘was soon accepted that the definition of unfair labour practice was broad enough to 
encompass it.’103 The task of defining the concept of unfair dismissal was thus left to the 
                                                            
95 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation part 5 RP47/1979. 
96 Bennet C (1992) 5. According to Van Jaarsveld & Van Eck, ‘[m]any circumstances and problems, 
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99 Act 28 of 1956. 
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Industrial Court.104 Little wonder therefore, that this has sometimes been referred to as 
the court’s legislative nature. In terms of section 46(9)(c) of the principal Act,105  the 
Industrial Court was also entrusted with the task of determining disputes concerning 
alleged unfair labour practices. 
A fresher and more expanded definition of the concept of unfair labour practice was 
introduced following the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act 95 of 1980. A more 
significant consequence of this 1980 amendment was that it removed the court’s 
‘legislative’ function of defining the concept of unfair labour practice and leaving it with 
the function of determining the dispute.106 The definition of the unfair labour practice 
was now left for the legislature to determine. 
Before the passage of the 1988 amendment to the Labour Relations Act, South African 
law had no express statutory basis for the doctrine of unfair dismissal.107 The concept of 
an unfair labour practice was new to South African law and unfair dismissals were not 
strictly regulated by statutes as they were, for instance, in Britain.108 The Industrial Court 
has often been guided by the developments of the concept in Britain and in the United 
States, as well as being guided by international labour standards.109 
 Until September1988 therefore, the concept of ‘unfair dismissal’ had no express 
statutory foundation, but was developed from the broad definition of ‘unfair labour 
practice’ over which the Industrial Court had exclusive jurisdiction. Yet the broad 
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definition harbored the foundations for the development of a distinct jurisprudence of 
unfair dismissal. The Industrial Court fleshed out this bare framework by importing the 
principles enshrined in the Termination of Employment Recommendation 119 of 1963 of 
the ILO.110 The court enquired whether there had been a ‘valid and fair’ reason for the 
termination, and whether the employer had given the employee a fair and reasonable 
opportunity of speaking in rebuttal or in mitigation of the complaints in accordance with 
the audi alteram partem rule.111  
Substantive changes were introduced to the principal act by the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act 83 of 1988 and for the first time provided statutory recognition for the 
concept of ‘unfair dismissal’.112  
The amending 1988 Act, in addition to introducing the concept of unfair dismissal, 
brought in the element of substantive fairness, however vague.  
Even the Labour Relations Amendment Act 9 of 1991 which came into effect on 1 May 
1991 did very little to clarify the concept of unfair dismissal statutorily. Wider powers to 
determine this concept was left exclusively with the Industrial Court.113 
Statutory history in dismissal law has proven, therefore, that before the advent of the 
current LRA, the concept of unfair dismissal under which operational requirements 
dismissal is listed as one of the components or categories received very little statutory 
attention. The absence of clear statutory development in the area of unfair dismissal 
obviously affected the rapid growth of consistent jurisprudence in this area of the law. Its 
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definition and development was left at the mercy of the Industrial Court which only came 
into existence after the Wiehahn Commission recommendations of 1979. 
Amid this late attention that the concept of unfair dismissal received from statutes, the 
focus of this chapter will now shift to how the Industrial Court grappled with unfair 
dismissal cases in its jurisprudence developed especially under the 1956 LRA with 
emphasis on substantive fairness in the dismissal for operational requirements.  
2.5 Development of the Law on Substantive Fairness under the Labour Relations 
Act of 1956: The Role of the Court 
 With the repeal of the 1988 codification,114 the law on retrenchment was based on the 
guidelines laid down by the Industrial Court from time to time115 such as: the employer 
must consider ways to avoid or minimise retrenchment,116 give sufficient prior warning 
to a representative trade union of the pending retrenchment and to the employees 
selected for retrenchment,117 and that the retrenchment must be reasonable, made in 
good faith and there must be a commercial rationale for the retrenchment.118  In addition 
to the aforementioned guidelines, section 1(4) of the 1956 LRA permitted the unfair 
labour practice definition to be interpreted in the light of the requirements laid down in 
the 1988 definition. 
While the amendment in 1988 of the 1956 LRA established the Labour Appeal Court in 
1988, the Industrial Court operating under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction 
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117 Shezi v Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd (1984) 5 ILJ 3 (IC) 12. 
118 Combined Small Factory Workers Union & Others v Aircondi Refrigeration (1990) 11 ILJ 532 (IC) 
546G-I. 
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established the above guidelines which they saw as constituting fair employment 
practices. Paramount of the guidelines is that the decision to retrench must be 
reasonable and made in good faith and there must be a commercial rationale for the 
retrenchment. This was the dispensation under the 1956 LRA but what was the role of 
the Industrial Court under this regime?  
 The relationship between employer and employee has been described as one which is 
‘mercantile to the core’.119 The employer’s right to promote its own interest in a 
competitive market is a value both accepted and encouraged by the free enterprise 
system. The law regulating dismissal ‘extends recognition to that value by regarding a 
dismissal on account of the operational requirements of the business as legitimate.’120 
There is often not even in principle ‘a clear right or wrong answer to the question 
whether a business change is necessary to the point of justifying a dismissal.’121 The 
procedural side of dismissal for operational requirements ‘holds no terror for judges, 
though, and it is this more familiar territory that has attracted their compensating 
attention.’122 
 Todd & Damant agree with Thompson and state that,  
[t]here is seldom if ever, a right or wrong answer to the question whether a particular 
dismissal is necessary or justified by the business imperatives on which it is grounded. The 
enquiry is not a fact-finding one but rather one that assumes the form of a review of the 
norms that the employer sought to establish- norms that determine the distribution of cost 
and benefits.123  
Consequent to this, Thompson writes that ‘the courts therefore instinctively look for 
ways of avoiding being drawn into the economic merits of a decision, and the natural 
                                                            
119 Brassey M et al (1987) 65. 
120 Le Roux PAK & Van Niekerk A The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 235. 
121 Thompson C ‘Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal’ (1999) 
20 ILJ 755 at 769. 
122 Thompson C (1999) 769.  
123 Todd C & Damant G ‘Unfair Dismissal-Operational Requirements’ (2004) 25 ILJ 896 at para 1. 
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response has been to give employers a hefty margin of grace in this quarter.’124  The 
court showed a marked reluctance to ‘second guess’ an employer’s decision to dismiss 
employees for operational grounds.125 The hefty margin accorded to employers by the 
court therefore, has been the axis of legal challenge over the years and the result of 
which has been the court’s adjustment of its decisions of abstaining to scrutinise the 
employer’s reasons for retrenchment toward scrutinising such decisions.  
Despite the formal requirement of adjudication, it has been stated that the underlying 
issue in dispute was ‘essentially economic.’126 It was perhaps the economic nature of 
this form of dismissal that created the uncertainty in this area of the law. Hence, there 
was a need for statutory intervention to lessen the legal controversy in this category of 
dismissal, which led to the current LRA and its subsequent amendment in August 
2002.127  However, to understand the uncertain journey in the adjudication history in this 
area of the law, it is perhaps helpful to assess the court’s position during this era when 
the courts were abstaining from scrutinising the employer’s reasons for retrenchment 
when one can almost say that the managerial prerogative was all but impenetrable. The 
departure point in this assessment will be to retrace pertinent decisions in operational 
requirement dismissal with emphasis on the substantive aspects from the Industrial 
Courts to the current Labour and Labour Appeal Courts. 
                                                            
124  Thompson C (1999)769. 
125 Du Toit D, Bosch D, Godfrey S et al Labour Relations Law-A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) 425. 
126 Thompson C (1999) 769. 
127 Labour Relations Amendment Act 12 of 2002. 
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2.6 The Abstention Approach of the Courts in Substantive Fairness Dismissal for 
Operational Requirements 
Commercial rationale has been the focal point in the context of adjudicating the 
substantive fairness in dismissals for operational requirement. On one enduring strand, 
‘the courts have held that all that is required of the employer’s termination decision 
(assuming due process) is that it be bona fide and imbued with commercial rationale.’128 
This is reflected in the following extract from Morester Bande (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & 
another:129 
The industrial court has in the past stressed time and again that, as a general rule, 
redundancy will be regarded as a fair and valid reason to dismiss an employee and 
accordingly the court will not regard a bona fide decision to retrench such an employee as 
unfair…130 
 It was initially clearly established that, as a general rule, the court will not interfere in an 
employer’s decision to retrench provided that the court was satisfied that an acceptable 
reason for the retrenchment existed and that the decision was bona fide.131 The court 
has generally demonstrated a reluctance to interfere with the employer’s decision to 
retrench unless the motive amounts to victimisation or some other form of anti-union 
activity.132 Where the decision to retrench is based on economic considerations the 
court will not impose its view of the most appropriate commercial decision in the 
circumstances on the employer.133  
                                                            
128 Thompson C & Benjamin P South African Labour Law (2006) 472. 
129 (1990) 11 ILJ 687 (LAC). 
130 At 688J.  
131 Le Roux PAK & Van Niekerk A The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 242. 
132 SACWU & Others v Toiletpak Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & Others (1988) 9 ILJ 295 (IC) 305G.  
133 Le Roux PAK & Van Niekerk A (1994) 242. 
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The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) has held that neither it nor the Industrial Court is 
equipped to decide economic, business, and commercial issues.134 That remark 
notwithstanding, an increase in profitability and business efficiency has been held to 
constitute an acceptable reason for retrenchment-it is not necessary that the employer 
demonstrates that the effect of the retrenchment will be the cutting of cost.135 
It seemed to be settled at this stage that a commercial rationale for retrenchment 
equated the fairness of such retrenchment. If an employer could prove that the 
dismissal of a certain employee or group of employees was predicated or bordered on 
commercial rationale, it meant that the dismissal was fair. There would be no judicial 
reversal of the employer’s decision to dismiss for operational requirement however ill-
conceived that decision may be proven to be. And so, dismissals resulting from poor 
management decisions were to an extent unimpeachable and would not be unfair for 
that purpose alone.136 The court did not want to enter the fray as to assess 
management economic decisions to retrench for operational requirement and to migrate 
in their opinion a purely commercial decision into a legal debate. To avoid this, it 
seemed best to let management have their way.137 
The most important question that arose from a consideration of the cases dealing with 
the substantive fairness of retrenchments before the advent of the current LRA 
‘concerns the degree of deference to be shown by the courts in their assessment of the 
employer’s business decisions, and the impact of that assessment on the requirement 
                                                            
134 Mobius Group (Pty) Ltd v Corry (1993) 2 LCD 193 (LAC). 
135 Morester Bande (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & another (1990) 11 ILJ 687 (LAC) 689. 
136 Benjamin & Others v Plessey Tellumat SA Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 595 (LC) 596G-H. 
137 Todd C & Damant G ‘Unfair Dismissal: Operational Requirements’ (2004) 25 ILJ 896. 
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of fairness.’138 The real question is the extent to which the court was willing to respect or 
accept the commercial rationale advanced by the employer to retrench as the cardinal 
reason for such termination. Or, put another way, to what level was the court willing to 
allow the commercial reason by the employer in a retrenchment exercise for operational 
requirements to go unchallenged? Within this level of how the court can humbly respect 
the employer’s decision to retrench, lies the degree of deference to be shown by the 
court. But as seen above, earlier decisions from both the Industrial and Labour Courts 
held that as a general rule, once the court was satisfied that the employer’s decision to 
retrench was based upon sound economic consideration, it will not interfere with such 
decision.139 In other words, it was the courts position that in matters regarding unfair 
dismissal for operational requirements, the employer’s burden was just to establish that 
a bona fide case for retrenchment existed and that it was commercial in nature.140 With 
great respect, it was perhaps irrelevant during this time if the decision to retrench was 
defensible or otherwise, the burden of proof expected from the employer was merely a 
commercial rational.   
The burden to establish a commercial rationale was quite simple for employers. Actually 
the employer was allowed only to submit its financial statements and intimate that there 
is a commercial rationale to retrench employees, and this, in the opinion of the court 
was tantamount to good faith and fairness.141 In Combined Small Factory Workers 
                                                            
138 Todd C & Damant G (2004) 900. ‘Deference’ as used in retrenchment cases literally means ‘to accept 
or give in humbly to something.’ Oxford Dictionary 3ed (1987) 227.  
139Todd C & Damant G ’Unfair Dismissal: Operational Requirements’ (2004) 25 ILJ 896 at 901. 
140 Morester Bande (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of SA & Another (1990) 11 ILJ 686 at 
689. 
141 Combined Small Factory Workers Union & Others v Aircondi Refrigeration (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 532 
at 533F. 
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Union & others v Aircondi Refrigeration, therefore, it was suggested that there exists a 
presumption in favour of commercial rationale and that it is: 
 encumbent upon the employee to present enough facts to raise a reasonable inference of 
an ulterior motive before the court would draw an adverse inference from the failure by the 
employer to disclose detailed financial information on which the decision was based.142  
The judgment does not consider the difficulties which a union will invariably encounter in 
obtaining information which is often at the exclusive disposal of the employer.143 The 
presentation of a financial statement indicating a decline in corporate finances or 
questionable stability amounted to a presumption of commercial rationale. The court’s 
abstentionist attitude or deference is perhaps best expressed in TGWU & Others v 
Putco Ltd,144 a case which concerned the closure of a business. The court stated: 
[It is] submitted that the decision to close the division was one of policy and that this was a 
function of management which it was entitled to exercise without negotiation or 
consultation. In the course of argument I was not referred to, neither was I aware of, any 
authoritative pronouncement on that or any related topic. Ordinary business logic, 
however, suggests to me that [the] submission is sound. After all, it is management which 
has its hands on the controls and its eyes on the instrument panel, so to speak. Logically it 
is for management to react to what the instruments show. Particularly in the case of a 
public company, the directors also have a duty towards its share holders to make sound 
management decisions in response to events.145 
In NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines,146 the Industrial Court explained why it accepted 
this managerial prerogative as the exclusive preserve of management or employer 
which it is most likely not to interfere with: 
The only prerequisite for a proper exercise of such prerogative are that it must be bona fide 
and that a business rationale must exist. (We are somewhat doubtful about the second 
requirement-after all in business frequently not always the best decision is taken. Perhaps 
management has the right to be foolish as long as it is strictly bona fide in its 
deliberation).147 
 
                                                            
142 Ibid. 
143 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A Guide to South African Labour Law 2ed (1992) 238. 
144 (1987) 8 ILJ 801. 
145 At 806D-E. 
146  (1992) 13 ILJ (IC). 
147 At 408A. 
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The rationale for this deferential approach adopted by the Industrial Court in assessing 
the company’s decision to retrench appeared to be two-fold. Todd & Damant explain: 
First, the judicial officers adopted the view that they were not necessarily the best qualified 
people to assess the merits of a business decision to determine whether those decisions 
were based on sound business or economic principles. Secondly, there was a distinct 
reluctance to allow the fair labour practice jurisdiction to restrict or limit the range of 
possible economic decisions that could be taken by managers of a business in the genuine 
belief that they are pursuing the best interest of the business.148 
While examining the law relating to dismissal for operational requirements under the 
1956 LRA, Le Roux & Van Niekerk,149 endorse the Industrial Court’s approach in 
NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines. They argue that if an operational reason exists for 
the dismissal, judicial intervention has to be restricted to dismissals in bad faith or for 
improper motives. One may differ with the authors in that if a commercial decision 
cannot be scrutinised, how then will the court establish which decision is a sham and 
which is bona fide? 
The focus of the Industrial Court, therefore, was not whether the employer’s 
mismanagement led to retrenchment or not, but only that the reason for retrenchment 
was bona fide.150 It did not matter that the decision could later be shown to have been a 
bad one for the business especially as there was no requirement to weigh up the benefit 
to the business against the hardship caused to workers in the form of job losses.151 
Without weighing the decision against certain consequences like the hardship of the 
innocent and affected employees, it could be difficult to establish which commercial 
decision is fair and which is unfair. The Industrial Court even went further to accept that 
                                                            
148 Todd C & Damant G (2004) 901. 
149 Le Roux PAK & Van Nierkerk A The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 238. 
150 Benjamin & Others v Plessey Tellumat SA Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 595 (LC) at para 4. 
151 Todd C & Damant G ‘Unfair Dismissal-Operational Requirements’ (2004) 25 ILJ 896 at 902. 
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a desire to increase profit and business efficiency constituted a fair reason to retrench152 
and that an employer need not prove that it faces the prospect of a financial ruin.153 
Even as the current LRA came into force and as recent as 2003, the LAC still held the 
view that the argument that an employer cannot retrench  employees in order to 
increase profit but only to ensure survival is not supported by a proper reading of the 
LRA.154 Hence the abstentionist approach adopted by the courts under the 1956 Act 
resurfaced under the current LRA. 
In this era of abstention, the burden rested on the employees to present enough facts to 
raise a reasonable inference of ulterior motive in the employer’s decision, before the 
court could draw an adverse inference from the failure by the employer to disclose 
detailed financial information on which its decision to retrench is rooted.155 
This leeway given to employers by judicial officers in the form of managerial prerogative 
notwithstanding, the courts have in some cases denied the employers the liberty to use 
retrenchments to rid themselves of employees whose services have previously proven 
unsatisfactory and they are certainly never entitled to retrench for ulterior motives such 
as membership of a particular union.156 Going against the grain of the then 
accumulating case law, the former LAC raised the bar in the 1993 decision of National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd.157 The LAC hearing 
                                                            
152 Food & Allied Workers Union & Others v Kellogg SA (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 ILJ 406 (IC) 413. 
153 Van Rensberg v Austin Safe Company (1998) 19 ILJ 158(LC) at 168F. 
154 Fry’s Metal (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at para 33. 
155Combine Small Factory Workers Union & Others v Aircondi Refrigeration (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 532 at 
533G. 
156 Kabeni & Others v Cementile Products (Ciskei) (Pty) Ltd & another (1987) 8 ILJ 442 (IC) in which the 
court found that the true reason for the decision to relocate the business which in turn resulted in the 
retrenchment was to rid the workforce of a union’s presence. 
157 (1993) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC). 
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this matter on appeal departed sharply from a hands-off assessment of the employers 
operational reasons to retrench into full intervention. 
2.7 The Court’s Departure from Abstention to Intervention 
In a decision that indicated an ideological shift of practical significance, the former LAC 
in National Union of Metal Workers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd interpreted 
the Industrial Court’s abstentionist approach as focusing on the correctness of a 
business decision, which in its opinion is quite relative. The LAC focused instead on the 
fairness of the employer’s decision. In delivering the landmark judgment, it was held that 
termination of employment for operational reasons should always be a measure of last 
resort. The court expressed its view in the following much quoted passage: 
[W]e respectfully differ from their suggestion that the decision to retrench could be fair 
simply because it is bona fide and made in a business-like manner. That approach 
suggests that the court’s function is merely to determine whether or not the decision had 
been correct. What is at stake here is not the correctness or otherwise of the decision to 
retrench but the fairness thereof. Fairness in this context goes further than bona fide and 
the commercial justification for the decision to retrench. It is concerned, first and foremost, 
with the question whether termination of employment is the only reasonable option in the 
circumstances. It has become trite for the courts to state that termination of employment for 
disciplinary and performance related reasons should always be a measure of last resort. 
That in our view applies equally to termination of employment for economic or operational 
reasons.158 
The LAC was perhaps enunciating that the era of abstention has ended and that the 
court’s approach will now be to scrutinise the employer’s decision to retrench for 
operational reasons. According to Grogan: 
 [t]he requirement that dismissal must be the only reasonable option clearly imports an 
objective element into the test. It will no longer be sufficient for the employer to state that it 
considered retrenchment in general, or the termination of the services of particular 
employees, to be for the good of the business. If a court finds that dismissal could have 
been avoided by adopting some reasonable alternative, dismissal will be deemed unfair.159 
                                                            
158 At 648. 
159 Grogan J Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices 2ed (2007) 438. 
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The employee’s interest in a business is more than a pecuniary one and the merit of a 
decision by the employer affecting the operational requirements of the business is not 
sacrosanct.160 What was the issue at this stage was whether the courts are better 
placed than management to make decisions regarding the operational requirements of 
the business. Le Roux & Van Niekerk believe that the courts lack the knowledge to 
make business decisions. They write that:  
[t]he qualifications, experience, and knowledge of members of the court are not such that 
the court would inevitably be a more authoritative arbiter of what is the best or, in the words 
of Atlantis Diesel decision the most reasonable decision in any particular set of 
circumstances.161 
 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
 In this chapter, it is shown that the historical development of the law of unfair dismissal 
with specific emphasis on the substantive fairness for dismissal for operational 
requirements has been necessitated to an extent by the shortcomings of the common 
law. In the period before 1995 there was very little statutory development in the field of 
unfair dismissal, especially substantive fairness in operational requirement dismissal in 
South Africa. On their part, the courts elected to take a deferential approach that only 
later on developed into the measure of last resort position in adjudicating the fairness of 
operational requirement dismissals.   
 
 
                                                            
160 Jordaan B ‘Transfer, closure & insolvency of undertakings’ (1991) 12 ILJ 935. 
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Chapter 3 
Substantive Fairness Dismissal in Operational Requirements and the 
Current Labour Relations Act 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the law on substantive fairness after the 1995 
LRA. It will assess the concept of fairness and the concept of the ‘similar needs’ of the 
employer. It will focus on the law on substantive fairness and the role of the court before 
and after the 2002 amendment of the LRA. The chapter will end with conclusive 
remarks on its findings.  
 
Regardless of the fact that the Wiehahn Commission of 1979162 recommended that 
government should use international labour standards as a focal point of its law on 
dismissal, there was no statutory effort domestically to advance and realise these 
recommendations. One may say therefore that before the introduction of the current 
LRA, there was no statutory law on the dismissal for operational requirement.  
 
After close to a century of statutory neglect, the current LRA came into effect in 1996 
and brought with it operational requirement dismissal among other forms of dismissal. 
Apart from section 188 of the LRA which contains the element of fairness in operational 
requirement dismissal,163 section 189 lays down the procedure to be complied with by 
an employer contemplating dismissal for operational requirement. The LRA did not 
statutorily address the issue of substantive fairness in operational requirements 
                                                            
162 See above at 2.4.  
163 See below at 3.2. 
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dismissal as it did with the procedural aspect under section 189. The inability of the LRA 
to adequately address the substantive fairness in operational requirements dismissal 
led to the incoherence in the decisions of the Labour and Labour Appeal Courts which 
will be examined in this chapter. It is this uncertainty brought by the incoherence of the 
various court decisions and to an extent, pressure from labour unions amongst other 
that led to the amendment of the LRA in August 2002.  
 
3.2 The Concept of Fairness 
 
Before the introduction of the Industrial court, the concept of fairness was not really the 
determining factor of dismissal under the previous LRA.164 During this time, dismissals 
were either lawful or unlawful. However, when a specialist Industrial Court (IC) was 
introduced on the recommendation of the Wiehahn Commission report, ‘fairness’ 
assumed centre stage in South African labour jurisprudence.165 The Commission saw 
‘unfairness’ as something that could be ‘related to the right to work, to associate, to 
bargain collectively, to withhold labour, to protection and to training and 
development.’166 
 
The following years saw the courts giving content to the vague notion of fairness in the 
employment context under a statutory unfair labour practice definition. It was 
                                                            
164 Act 28 of 1956. 
165 Bosch C ‘Balancing the Act: Fairness and Transfer of Business’ (2004) 25 ILJ 923. 
166 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation part 5 RP47/1979 para 4.127.20.  
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acknowledged that determining what is fair is a value judgment,167 one which was made 
by the courts based on their sense of what was equitable, drawing extensively on the 
jurisprudence of the ILO and of other countries.168 
 
The principles developed by the IC under the 1956 Act were essentially codified in the 
current LRA. The legislature did not make any fundamental changes when it devised 
section 189 of the LRA. However, more significant than the introduction of the LRA was 
the adoption in 1996 of a new Constitution for South Africa to which all law was made 
subordinate.169 In terms of the Constitution ‘every person has the right to fair labour 
practices’.170 Thus, ‘fairness’ became a constitutional imperative.  
 
Section 213 of the LRA defines operational requirements as ‘requirements based on the 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs of the business.’ The LRA provides 
in section 188 (1) that:   
 
A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove- 
a) That the reason for dismissal is a fair reason- 
               
                           i)      Related to the employees conduct or capacity; 
                          ii)      Based on the employer’s operational requirements; 
 
b) That the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. 
 
Section 188 (2) goes on to proclaim that in considering the fairness of a dismissal, one 
must take into account the fairness of the reason, the fairness of the procedure and any 
                                                            
167 Cobra Watertech v National Union of Metal Workers of SA (1995) 16 ILJ 607 (LAC) 611.  
168 Bosch C (2004) 25 ILJ 923. 
169 Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
170 Section 23 (1) of the Constitution.  
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related code of good practice issued in terms of the Act. The Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal based on Operational Requirements171 defines the ambit of dismissal based 
on the operational requirements of the employer. Section 189 read with section 186172 
sets out the requirements to be complied with in dismissal for operational requirements 
and section 192 (2) proclaims that ‘if the existence of the dismissal is established, the 
employer must prove that the dismissal is fair.’ 
 
The procedure laid down by section 189 applies only to dismissals for reasons based on 
the employer’s operational requirements. Employee’s who are dismissed for other 
reasons, for example, incapacity, are not entitled to be consulted in terms of section 
189.173 As far as employees are concerned, section 189 renders all employees subject 
to dismissal if the operational requirements of their employer so dictate.174  
 
A cursory reading of section 189 and 189A of the LRA suggests that the requirements 
placed on employers contemplating retrenchment are primarily procedural.175 However, 
the LAC has suggested otherwise. In Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union & Others,176  the LAC held that  
the primary obligation of a retrenching employer is to initiate the consultation process 
when it contemplates dismissal for operational reasons. It must disclose relevant 
information to the other consulting party, and allow the other consulting party an 
opportunity during consultation to make representations about any matter on which they 
                                                            
171 GN 1517 Government Gazette 20254 of 16 July 1999. 
172 Section 186 of the LRA sets out the meaning of dismissal.  
173 Grogan J Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices 2ed (2007) 436. 
174 Grogan J Dismissal (2010) 349. 
175 Grogan J Workplace Law 7ed (2003) 197. 
176 (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC). 
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are consulting. And that the employer must consider these representations and, if it does 
not agree with them, it must give reasons to that effect.177  
The court added, however, that these formal obligations 
are geared to a specific purpose, namely to attempt to reach consensus on the subjects 
listed in section 189 (2). The ultimate purpose of section 189 is thus to achieve a joint 
consensus-seeking process. In this manner the section implicitly recognises the employer’s 
right to dismiss for operational reasons, but then only if a fair process aimed at achieving 
consensus has failed. This is also apparent from section 189 (7) which provides that the 
employer must select the employees to be dismissed on criteria either agreed to, or if this 
is not possible, on criteria that are fair and objective.178 
 
However far the courts may be prepared to go in evaluating the objective need to 
retrench as will be seen in the following pages, it is apparent that the question whether 
an employer has complied with section 189 has both a procedural and a substantive 
dimension even though the section contains no express provision of substantive 
fairness. The question is not whether the parties have gone through the motions of 
consulting over the various issues listed in section 189 (2), but whether these attempts 
have been real. The Labour Court has described the procedural aspect of section 189 
as a ‘set of self-standing duties with which an employer must comply or run the risk of a 
retrenchment being declared invalid’. In short, the section ‘gives content and colour to 
fairness in retrenchment and its significance as such should not be underrated; but 
ultimately, the Act provides only a guide for the purpose, and cannot be treated as a set 
of rules that conclusively disposes of the issue of fairness.’179 
 
Although the substantive and procedural obligations of the parties are intertwined, it is 
very clear that the LRA as it stood before the 2002 amendment did not specifically 
                                                            
177 At para 27. 
178 Ibid. See also Thembu MA ‘Dismissal for Operational Requirement’ (2003) 15 SAMercLJ 348. 
179 Fletcher v Elna Sewing Machine Centers (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 603 (LC). 
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address the substantive nature of operational requirement dismissal apart from the 
procedural aspect. 
The concept of operational requirement dismissal itself is derived from the ILO 
Convention 158.180 Article 4 of Convention 158 recognises a valid reason ‘based on the 
operational requirement of the undertaking, establishment or services’ as a legitimate 
justification for dismissal and Article 13 of the Convention imposes specific obligations 
on employers who contemplate termination for ‘reasons of an economic, technological, 
structural or similar nature’.181 However, ILO Recommendation 166182 casts more light 
on the matter when it provides for the following 
19. (i) All parties concerned should seek to avert or minimize as far as possible termination 
of employment for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature 
without prejudice to the efficient operation of the undertaking, establishment or services 
and to mitigate the adverse effects of any termination of employment for these reasons on 
the workers concerned. 
21. The measures which should be considered with a view to averting or minimizing 
termination of employment for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar 
nature might include inter alia, restrictions of hiring, spreading the work force reduction 
over a certain period of time to permit natural reduction of the work force, internal transfers, 
training and retraining, voluntary early retirement with appropriate income protection, 
restriction of overtime and reduction of normal hours of work. 
 
While an ILO Recommendation does not have the force of international law, it may 
nevertheless be persuasive when seeking to interpret a requirement of the relevant 
convention or, in this case, the LRA.183 The abovementioned guidelines have entered 
South African case law,184 and it has been noted that, ‘the Act and the Code follow the 
                                                            
180 Termination of Employment Convention 158 of 1982. 
181 Van Niekerk A Unfair Dismissal 4ed (2008) 85. 
182 Termination of Employment Recommendation 166 of 1982. 
183 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirement Dismissal: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 25 ILJ 595 at 604. 
184 Manyaka v Van de Wertering Engineering (Pty) Ltd (1997) 11 BLLR 1458 (LC) 1464. 
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approach of the ILO concerning fair termination of employment’ as manifested in 
Convention 158 and Recommendation 166.185 
 Furthermore, section 3 (a) of the LRA provides that the Act must be interpreted to give 
effect to its primary objects and these include giving effect to and regulating the 
fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution, and giving effect to 
obligations incurred by South Africa as a member state of the ILO.186 
 
Du Toit has submitted that with respect to fairness, section 23 of the Constitution is of 
little assistance in the present context in that it contains no residual concept of fairness 
nor any more precise definition than that contained in the LRA.187 The LRA does not 
exhaustively regulate the constitutional right to fair labour practices and in Baloyi v M & 
P Manufacturing,188 it was held that, the fact that the constitutional rights to fair labour 
practices is not exhausted under the LRA  does not affect the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed. Fairness in section 188 of the LRA, Du Toit has suggested, must be 
interpreted to mean the same as ‘valid’ in Article 4 of ILO Convention 158.189  
 
Apart from the ILO having influenced the wording of section 213 of the LRA, the 
legislature did not make any fundamental changes to legal controls on employer’s right 
to retrench when it devised section 189. In the 2002 amendment to the LRA, the 
prohibition on striking over retrenchments has been partially removed and certain 
                                                            
185 Smuts v Adair & Others (1999) 4 BLLR 392 (LC) para 24. 
186 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirement Dismissal: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 25 ILJ 595 at 603. 
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procedural requirements added.190 From this brief assessment of operational 
requirements dismissal, it is evident that the LRA was silent on substantive fairness until 
the introduction of the 2002 amendment. 
 
3.3 Substantive Fairness in Operational Requirement Dismissals 
The procedural aspect of dismissal for operational requirements is less controversial 
than substantive fairness and it will not be an overstatement to say that the law appears 
to have reached some kind of equilibrium in this area.191 Unlike dismissal for 
misconduct and incapacity, one may say that the dismissal for operational requirements 
has attracted controversy in many quarters from academics, trade unions, lawyers and 
the courts. The discontent and uncertainty in this area of the law perhaps commenced 
with the definition of operational requirement in section 213 as a form of dismissal 
permissible under section 188 of the LRA. 
Operational requirement is defined under section 213 of the act as ‘requirements based 
on the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of the employer’. As will be 
seen later on, although economic and technological reasons have attracted some 
controversy of their own by the very nature of what qualifies them, such as when they 
are so imperative as to justify dismissal, ‘similar needs’ has widened the controversy in 
that it is hard to define or qualify all of its constituents and that the list of its content is 
inexhaustible. ‘Similar needs’ actually seem to be an ingredient without borders as far 
as the economic needs of a business is concerned. Perhaps to understand the 
controversy imported by ‘similar needs’, it might be helpful to assess this ingredient 
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because its insertion into the definition of operational requirements has brought more 
troubles than solutions.192 The language of ‘similar needs’ may have provided 
employers and their legal representatives with all sort of excuses to view other aspects 
of dismissal in the lens of operational requirements as will be seen at a later stage of 
this chapter. 
The Code of Good Practice on Dismissal for Operational Requirements concedes that 
dismissal for operational requirements is a ‘no fault’ dismissal which means that the 
dismissal is by no reason of the action or omission of the employees concerned. The 
Code elaborates as follows on the types of reasons for dismissals for operational 
requirements: 
As a general rule, economic reasons are those that relate to the financial management of 
the enterprise. Technological reasons refer to the introduction of new technology that 
affects work relationships either by making existing jobs redundant or by requiring 
employees to adapt to the new technology or a consequential restructuring of the work 
place. Structural reasons relate to redundancy of posts consequent to a restructuring of the 
employer’s enterprise.193 
In amplifying the broad description in item 1 of the Code of Good Practice, Grogan194 
took the view that: 
Technological reasons refers to the introduction of new machinery or technological 
innovation that affect working relationships by rendering jobs redundant or by requiring the 
employees to adapt working conditions to new technologies, even when this alters the 
existing conditions of the plant in the wide sense of the term. Structural reasons include 
circumstances in which an enterprise reforms into new working groups or combines with 
others, a process commonly known as restructuring. Economic reasons relate to the 
financial state of the enterprise. These are normally external factors such as the state of 
the market and the economy, which impacts on business profitability. A drop in demand for 
a company’s product may require budget cuts and the reduction of working hours. This can 
lead to job redundancy. 
In the case of operational requirements, the reasons have their origin in the employer’s 
needs and requirements. Basson paints the following familiar scenario 
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Under pressure, the employer may be forced into considering reducing its wage bill, the 
total remuneration to all employees. Alternatively, an employer may consider restructuring 
its organisation, some organisations restructure fluidly and rapidly to meet changing 
circumstances (such as a new competitor entering the market); in other organizations a 
restructuring may mean that some employees lose their place in the organisational 
structure. Taking a longer term view, an employer may opt to invest heavily in advanced 
technology requiring fewer and fewer employees to control and operate this technology.195 
 
The above views definitely represent the same situation and meet the expectation of the 
language rooted in section 213 of the Act. It is worth noting that in further elaboration of 
this section, item 1 of the Code of Good Practice on Dismissal refers to job losses 
flowing from the dismissal of operational requirement as constituting job redundancy. 
The word commonly used in practice in describing the large-scale losses of jobs due to 
operational requirements is retrenchment. It is pertinent and worth noting however, that 
in the case of Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd v The President, Industrial 
Court & Others,196 the Appellate Division of the former Supreme Court used a definition 
that covered both ‘retrenchment’ (in the narrow sense) and ‘redundancy’. The court 
defined retrenchment as ‘to cut down, to reduce, the number of employees because of 
redundancy, a superfluity of employees in relation to the work to be performed’.  
Be the difference between retrenchment and redundancy as it may, in South Africa, 
retrenchment is the preferred word used in describing large-scale dismissals for 
operational requirements.   
  
3.4 The Concept of the ‘Similar Needs of an Employer’ 
The expansive definition of operational requirements dismissal as defined in section 213 
is broad and as Van Niekerk commented  
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Its remit certainly includes a dismissal occasioned by a drop in production, the introduction 
of new technologies or work programs, the organisation of work and the restructuring of a 
business.197 
The statutory definition transcends the above mentioned indicators as its scope includes 
‘similar needs’ of the employer as an ingredient of operational requirements. Had the 
definition in section 213 covered only economic, technological and structural needs of 
the business, perhaps the law could have been approaching some kind of consistency 
in this area as is the case with procedural fairness of dismissal, but this has not been 
the case. With the constant changing nature of the corporate environment mostly 
masterminded by market forces, both domestic and international and often beyond the 
control of individual businesses, the ‘similar needs’ of the employer will probably remain 
inexhaustible.   
The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal for Operational Requirement points out in item 
12 that it is difficult to define all the circumstances of this form of dismissal while 
admitting it is a ‘no fault’ dismissal, that is, that the dismissal is by no reason of the 
action or attributes of the employees concerned.198 An employer’s ‘similar needs’ must 
be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. Basson has 
suggested that ‘there are no clear and absolute dividing line between an employer’s 
‘economic’ needs and similar needs−there maybe, and often are, considerable 
overlaps.’199 The ‘considerable overlaps’ referred to by Basson perhaps imply the 
impossibility to craft an exhaustive list of what will constitute the similar needs of any 
business.  
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The needs of an employer will obviously vary from business to business and perhaps 
from employer to employer given that employers may not employ similar strategies 
despite being confronted with the same problem.200 Even the Labour Court 
acknowledged the difficulties in delimiting the scope of ‘similar needs’  but took the view 
that the ‘similar needs’ of an employer ‘would seem to be restricted to grounds akin to 
economic, technological and structural reorganisation of the enterprise.’201  
However, over the years the courts have succeeded in categorising some of the ‘similar 
needs’ of the employer. Even as more needs emerge and the dividing lines between the 
three major aspects of dismissal blurs in the wake of unexpected business situations, 
‘similar needs’ will include, but not be limited to the following situations; 
a)   Special operational needs of the business.  
b)   The employee’s action or presence affects the business negatively. 
c)   The employee’s conduct or action has led to a breakdown of the trust relationship. 
d) The enterprise business requirements are such that changes must be made to the 
employee’s terms and conditions of employment.202 
3.4.1 Special Operational Needs of the Business 
The nature of the business may be one that places special demands on the employee. 
It may, for example, that the economic well−being of the business is in jeopardy, its 
survival at stake and consequent on this, the employees may be required to go flexible 
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with their working hours which ultimately will require them to work over-time.203 The 
employee’s refusal to assent to these demands might endanger the business and the 
employer may rightfully contemplate dismissal or termination of employment for 
operational requirements as a result of this need.204 In Steel, Engineering & Allied 
Workers Union of SA & Others v Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd,205 decided under the former 
LRA of 1956, there was no express term in the employee’s employment contract of 
service with Trident Steel to work over-time. The practice had been that employees 
would work over-time as and when the needs of the business required it. The 
employees declared an over-time ban in pursuit of the wage demands and Trident Steel 
dismissed them after the ban had been enforced for more than a week. Trident Steel 
alleged that the working of over-time was essential to its business operations and that it 
permitted it to offer a 24−hour service which enabled it to retain its market share in a 
highly competitive field.206  
The Industrial Court deemed it unnecessary to consider whether an implied term to 
work over-time existed as there was in its words ‘another more satisfactory basis upon 
which the issue of over-time may be decided’. The court held that the employees had 
been dismissed for a valid operational reason since the business requires workers who 
were prepared to work over-time as and when business demands necessitates it.207 It 
should be noted here that if the employer relies on business needs to dismiss 
employees for operational requirement who are either refusing or are unable to work 
over-time, the question of whether the over-time is compulsory or voluntary is 
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irrelevant.208 When the employer’s business needs require employees to work over-time 
and the employees refuse to do so, dismissal based on the operational needs of the 
business will be justified and it becomes immaterial whether such a clause was included 
in the contract of employment.  
Similarly in SACWU & Others v Afrox (Pty) Ltd,209 decided under the current LRA, the 
distribution system of the respondent, a supplier of gases, had resulted in its drivers 
working in excess of overtime (up to 22 hours overtime per week) and the employer 
decided to introduce a new shift system.210 The employer entered into consultation with 
the employee’s union which opposed the introduction of the staggered shift system. 
Certain proposals flowed from the consultation and were implemented for a trial period 
in an attempt to reduce overtime and prevent the introduction of the staggered shift 
system proposed by the employer. When the proposal failed to achieve the desired 
results, the employer decided to introduce the staggered shift system (having of course 
reserved the right to do so). The affected employees instituted a power play by resorting 
to a strike in a bid to prevent the employer from implementing the new system and the 
employer in return staged a lock-out in an effort to compel the disgruntled employees to 
work the staggered shift. When the lock-out failed to compel the employees to work the 
staggered shifts, the employer served a notice to the employees union on its intention to 
dismiss for operational requirement and began using external contractors to make its 
deliveries.211 Another consultative round was called but the consultation could not craft 
a solution and the striking drivers were dismissed for operational requirements. The 
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union contended that the dismissals were automatically unfair as the individual 
applicants had been dismissed for striking, that the respondent had not discharged its 
obligation to consult before retrenching, that the dismissals could have been avoided, 
and that the respondent had not shown that it was ‘going to the wall.’212 The court in 
Afrox, under Landman J held that: 
The enterprise which provides the employment must maintain its way, grow and prosper 
for rights to a job to have a meaning. If it fails then the right to a job fails with it. Economics 
dictates that if it is necessary to shed jobs so that the enterprise may survive or alter or 
adapt its business, then so be it.213 
In Media Workers Association of South Africa & Others v Independent Newspapers 
(Pty) Ltd,214 the LC, held that, even a bona fide restructuring exercise aimed at resisting 
negative economic trend, can result in a fair dismissal of employees.215 
 
3.4.2 The Employee’s Action or Presence affects the Business Negatively 
     The courts have accepted that an employee whose actions negatively affect the 
operation of the business could be dismissed for operational requirements, especially in 
circumstances where certain actions of an employee create disharmony among co-
workers, such as, antagonising co-workers by continually making racist or sexist 
remarks.216 In the case of Erasmus v BB Bread Ltd,217 fellow employees called for the 
dismissal of Erasmus, a manager with BB Bread. The employees complained about his 
uncompromising and difficult attitude towards them as well as his derogatory remarks 
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particularly aimed at black people. Erasmus’s attitude toward fellow employees affected 
the employer’s business negatively. BB Bread concluded that Erasmus was too great 
an industrial risk to continue with the company and so dismissed him for operational 
reasons as his presence and actions impacted the business negatively. The court took 
the view that 
the employer is entitled to insist on reasonable harmonious and interpersonal relations on 
its factory floor. Where disharmony results from the actions or presence of a particular 
employee, the employer is entitled to address the problem. It may be necessary for the 
employer to remove the employee from the scene.218 
It therefore has become possible that an employee could fairly be dismissed for 
operational requirements for reasons of incompatibility at the work place if such 
incompatibility has a negative bearing on other employees or clients to an extent that 
the well-being of the business as a whole is threatened. It is apparent that if the 
employee’s conduct has only limited effect on the operational needs of the business, 
then the dismissal could be for incapacity rather than for operational requirements. Du 
Toit’s219 thrust is that ‘incompatibility should be treated as a form of incapacity because 
it bears no relationship to the definition of operational requirements.’ It is submitted that 
Du Toit’s view is most compatible with the definition of operational requirements and 
that the judgment in Erasmus v BB Bread possibly blurred the lines between dismissal 
for incapacity and operational requirements to an extent.   
The three categories of dismissal, misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements 
seem at first glance to be easy to apply, but in practice they are often highly 
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ambiguous.220 This difficulty has been recognised by the courts. Thus, in SABC v 
CCMA & Others,221 Pretorius AJ commented on the emerging blurring lines in the 
various forms of dismissal as follows: 
The notional line between the various circumstances that could give rise to a fair dismissal 
(misconduct, poor performance, incapacity and operational requirement) is not always 
easy to draw. Often the same conduct may give rise to more than one appropriate 
categorisation. Employers may often, not unreasonably err in their attempts to categorise 
the circumstances giving rise to a potential dismissal. The failure to correctly categorise 
should not however detract from the appropriate inquiry in each case, namely to assess 
first, whether there was a substantively fair reason for dismissal and second, whether an 
appropriate and fair procedure was followed by the employer. 
Nonetheless, the courts have accepted that if the presence of an employee affects the 
operation of the business negatively, the employer will be justified to dismiss the 
employee for its operational reasons.222 
 
 3.4.3 The Employee’s Conduct has led to a Breakdown of the Trust Relationship 
The relationship between the employer and the employee is a relationship of full 
confidence. The employer expects the employee to always act in full confidence and 
adhere to the common law duty to act in good faith towards the business at all time. 
Although this duty is multifaceted, it essentially entails the obligation on the part of the 
employee to constantly strive to act in the best interest of the business.223 Under the 
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former LRA for example, the court in Premier Medical & Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v 
Winkler,224 stated the importance of honesty in employment services in this way: 
[I]n the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, there is involved in every contract of 
service an implied obligation, call it by what name you will, on the servant that he shall 
perform his duty, especially in these essential respects, namely that he shall honestly and 
faithfully serve his master; that he shall not abuse his confidence in matter appertaining to 
his service, and that he shall, by all reasonable means in his power, protect his master’s 
interests in respect to matters confided to him in the course of his service.225 
In Tiger Food Brands t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy NO & Others,226 the LC accepted 
threats of violence against managers by unidentified employees as a form of 
misconduct justified in closing down the branch and retrenching all the staff.227 In 
Chauke & Others v Lee Services Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors,228 the employer could 
not identify the employees involved in certain incidents of malicious damage to property 
and sabotage. In passing, the LAC noted that an employer could, in a situation such as 
this, consider dismissing the employees not for misconduct, but for operational 
requirements, but only when the dismissals are necessary to save the life of the 
enterprise.229 The LC has also accepted what is now known as ‘Shrinkage Cases’ 
where all employees are dismissed because of unacceptable losses due to theft as a 
fair reason for dismissal for operational requirements.230 These ‘shrinkage cases’, has 
shown that the line has blurred as operational needs traverses into all other forms of 
dismissal due to the requirement of ‘similar needs’. 
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3.4.4 Business Requirements Require Changes to the Employees’ Terms and 
Conditions 
An enterprise may have to be restructured, or it may have to merge or amalgamate with 
another enterprise, or its mode of operation may have to be altered in order to ensure 
its survival or to make it more competitive, or simply to enable it to keep abreast with the 
latest technology in the industry. These changes may lead to an employee becoming 
redundant but changes of this nature may also lead to an employee being offered a new 
position with changes to the terms and conditions of employment.231 If the employee 
unreasonably refuses to accept the changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment, the employee maybe dismissed for operational reasons.232 
In the case of Ndela v SA Stevedores Ltd,233 the employee refused the new position 
offered to him by the employer. SA Stevedores Ltd then offered him an alternative 
position which he still declined and the employer ultimately dismissed him for 
operational reasons having no alternatives left. The IC found the dismissal fair in terms 
of the previous LRA.234 The LAC was more cautious in the case of WL Ochse Webb & 
Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen235 where the employee was a sales man for WL Ochse 
Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd (the employer). He earned more than the other employees, 
as the sale of tomatoes attracted more commission than the sale of the vegetables sold 
by other employees, and this caused dissatisfaction among the other employees. The 
employer tried to address the problem by proposing a new remuneration system. The 
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salesman was given three alternative solutions. He could accept the new system, 
present an alternative system or resign. He proposed that the old system be 
maintained. When his proposition was rejected by the employer, he resigned.236 The 
LAC per Froneman J held that the employer had not acted unfairly. The court stated: 
Any successful business needs contented employees. Unhappiness can lead to problems 
such as labour unrest, a drop in productivity, and the like. The appellant (the employer) 
sought to address the unhappiness of the majority of its employees with the old 
remuneration structure, by seeking ways to change it. That remuneration structure (viz 
differentiated commission) was a remnant of previous statutory determination and not only 
of an agreement between the employees and the employer. If the problem was not 
addressed the possibility of further problems arising, such as those mentioned earlier, 
would have increased. The evidence on record does not establish an ulterior motive on the 
part of the appellant for attempting to find a new remuneration package. A commercial 
rationale for the changes was thus established.237 
The concept of ‘similar needs’ included in the definition of operational requirements in 
section 213 of the LRA has broadened the meaning of this concept of dismissal to an 
extent that nearly every single action of the employer that leads to dismissal within this 
context may find expression in the meaning of ‘similar needs’. Perhaps the impossibility 
of crafting an exhaustive list of what ‘similar needs’ are within the confine of the 
business sphere only heightened the legal uncertainty in this area of the law. Maybe it is 
with this uncertainty and difficulty in ascertaining  the limit to what the ‘similar needs’ of 
a business are in mind that the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) had 
proposed the revision of section 213 of the LRA almost a decade ago. COSATU had 
blamed the increasing loss of jobs during this period partly on the broad definition of 
operational requirements under section 213 of the LRA which includes ‘similar needs’ 
and on its wide interpretation which had a negative effect on employees in retrenchment 
matters because employers could increasingly justify their dismissals on ‘similar needs’ 
                                                            
236 At 363. 
237 At 366D-F. 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
of their businesses.238 Hence, COSATU’s proposals to amend section 213 were in 
effect partly to limit the wide ambit of the concept of ‘similar needs’. This, it argued, will 
be done by replacing ‘economic needs’ with ‘financial necessity’ and deleting ‘similar 
needs of an employer.’239 Using ‘financial necessity’ as a criterion may have the effect 
of limiting the employer’s entitlement to dismiss where the object is to increase profits. It 
may be difficult conceptually, and even practical, to equate the need to increase profits 
with financial necessity.240 Where the employer can, objectively speaking, retain some 
or all of the employees to be dismissed in order to increase profits, it may be difficult to 
justify the dismissal on the basis of financial necessity.241 This deletion could possibly 
have had a limiting effect on the section’s wide interpretation. The COSATU proposal of 
deleting ‘similar needs’ in the definition of operational requirements in section 213 was 
not incorporated in the amendment of the LRA in 2002. 
 
3.5 The Application of the law on substantive fairness before the 2002 
Amendment of the LRA 
 
As was stated before,242 the LRA identifies dismissals based on the operational 
requirements of the employer as one of the three forms of dismissals that are 
permissible, provided they are for a fair reason and in accordance with a fair 
procedure.243 Operational requirements are in turn defined as requirements based on 
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the economic, technological or similar needs of an employer.244However, the LRA 
provides no guidance on when ‘operational requirements’ are so pressing that they will 
justify dismissal of employees. This notwithstanding, retrenchment is therefore a 
dismissal that is based on the factors mentioned in the definition.  The debate over the 
operational requirements of a business is essentially an economic one, not a legal 
one.245 There must therefore be an objective link between the dismissal and some 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs of the employer.246 The employer’s 
mere ipse dixit that a dismissal was effected for these needs will not be sufficient to 
classify the dismissal as such.247 
In dismissal for operational requirements, it is not enough that the employer has a 
reason to dismiss, but that reason has to be fair. The task of the courts, Grogan writes,  
is to balance the interest of employers and employees in a manner that encourages 
employers not to resort to retrenchment lightly, and yet allows them sufficient latitude to 
restructure, adjust production, and determine staffing levels according to the vagaries of 
the market and the economic environment.248  
How that balance is struck, is determined by the degree to which lawmakers are 
prepared to regulate the job market by protecting employees against retrenchment.249 
The stakes are high for the courts, Thompson writes that: 
If the Labour Court takes an intrusive approach when the consequences of business 
restructuring plans are challenged, it will be accused — with some justification — of 
straying beyond its field of competence and meddling in a critical area of economic 
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decision making. If it takes a hands-off view, it will be accused of not fulfilling its statutory 
duty and of leaving labour at the mercy of rapacious market forces.250 
An employer therefore, can terminate the services of his employees on grounds of 
rationalisation, staff restructuring, financial or business operational reasons, provided he 
complies with certain requirements.251 The aims of these requirements which must be 
observed are amongst others to ensure that the employer does not act against the 
employee with ulterior motives.252 For this reason, it is required that retrenchment 
should not be resorted to until the employer has complied with both substantive and 
procedural requirements.253 
The starting point is first of all that the employer must prove that the proffered reason is 
one based on the operational requirement of the business.254 The employer will thus 
have to prove that the reason for dismissal falls within the statutory definition of 
operational requirements. Secondly, the employer must prove that the operational 
reason actually existed and that it was the real reason for the dismissal.255 Hence, in 
order to balance the employer’s interest in the ongoing success of the business with the 
employee’s interest in fairness and job security, the employer need to establish a 
defensible case for such termination. In the event that the professed reason advanced 
by the employer contemplating retrenchment under section 213 is not the true reason, 
the employer will be unable to show the fairness of the dismissal. While noting that it 
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has become an expression of power play between employers and the employees, 
Thompson put the glaring question of conflict of interest between them in this way: 
 is it a choice or no choice that sees so many people working more intensively at odd 
hours, under arrangements both more tenuous and varied, through telecommunication and 
in a host of other ways? Employers are pushing for particular changes and outcomes but 
so too are employees. And the repercussions of these two conflict zones of interest have 
sparked dismissal which in turn has led to a specter of incoherent legal decisions with 
varied outcomes.256  
The absence of precise statutory provisions relating to substantive fairness in 
operational requirements dismissal has rendered its establishment very complex before 
August 2002. The next part of this mini-thesis therefore will attempt to look into how the 
court fared without fixed legislative rules on the substantive fairness dismissal for 
operational requirements. 
3.6. The Role of the Court Before 2002  
The substantive and procedural obligations are inevitably intertwined257 even though 
they appear legally separate. They are interconnected because substance precedes 
procedure. In requiring consultations under section 189 of the current LRA, the statute 
sets out to promote two immediate objects and one indirect one. These objects, 
Thompson and Benjamin submit, are to ‘avoid if possible the need to retrench, minimise 
the impact of any dismissal that do occur and to maintain a reasonable relationship 
between employees and their representatives in what is seen as a generally testing time 
for them.’258 
                                                            
256 Thompson C ‘The Changing Nature of Employment’ (2003) 24 ILJ 1793 at 1794. 
257 Thompson C & Benjamin P The South African Labour Law (2006) 464. 
258 Ibid.  
 
 
 
 
64 
 
In the event that consultations fail to lead to an agreement, the dismissal will be found 
fair if certain thresholds have been met.259 An employer contemplating dismissal for 
operational requirements ‘will seek to ensure its plan complies with the minimum 
requirements of the governing law — the chief objective being to place that plan beyond 
legal attack.’260 However, ‘given the complexity and essentially economic character of 
the subject matter, it should come as no surprise to discover that the case law on 
substantive fairness shows some variation.’261 The LAC has expressed the view that 
operational requirements dismissals should be assessed against a standard of fairness 
that adequately gives effect to the employee’s right to be dismissed for a fair reason and 
interest in the retention of his job.262 However, this must be balanced against the 
employer’s need to be able to take the decisions that it deems necessary for the well-
being of the business.263   
One of the most important functions assigned to the Labour Court after the coming into 
force of the LRA is to determine the fairness or otherwise of a dismissal.264 While a 
court charged with assessing this form of dismissal must take into consideration the 
jurisprudence developed by the Industrial Court and the approach adopted by the 
former LAC, the question whether an employer’s dismissal based on operational 
requirement is fair or otherwise is one premised on facts.265  
                                                            
259Thompson C & Benjamin P (2006) 465. 
260Thompson C & Benjamin P (2006) 469.  
261 Thompson C & Benjamin P (2006) 465. 
262 BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU (2000) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC) 2269 H-I. 
263 BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU (2000) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC) 2269 D-E. 
264 Section 158(1)(a)(iii).  
265 Cohen T ‘The Reasonable Employer’s Test-Creeping in Through the Back Door?’ (2003) 15 SAMercLJ 
193. 
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The most important question that arises from a consideration of cases dealing with the 
substantive fairness of retrenchments concerns the degree of deference to be shown by 
the courts in their assessment of the employer’s business decisions and the impact of 
that assessment on the requirement of fairness.266 Whether it be efficiency, financial 
necessity, mergers, profits etc that any employer may contemplate as its operational 
reasons for dismissal under section 213, the burden of proof as proclaimed in section 
192(2), rests with the employer to show that the decision to dismiss passes the fairness 
test under section 188 of the LRA. The employer will not only be required to establish 
the existence of an operational reason for the contemplated retrenchment but that such 
a reason is the principal motive of the dismissal.267 The inquiry, Grogan proclaimed in 
2009  
is not simply whether the employer acted in good faith−ie whether there was a bona fide 
reason to retrench. The inquiry now goes further, and requires proof by the employer on a 
balance of probabilities, that the cause of or reason for the dismissal was based on 
operational requirements as defined, that a procedure was followed in accordance with 
section 189; and that there was a substantively fair reason for the dismissals.268 
Retrenchment, therefore, will be ‘self-evidently unfair if the employer seeks to achieve 
impermissible ends.’269 The test remains whether the decision to retrench was part of a 
bona fide attempt to improve the business, whether through restructuring, outsourcing, 
reducing production costs, or simply cutting the payroll.270  The courts therefore, will not 
hesitate to pronounce as unfair a purported retrenchment by an employer which is 
actually a disguise for something else, for instance underperformance271 or any other 
                                                            
266Todd C & Damant G (2004) ‘Unfair Dismissal-Operational Requirements’ (2004) 25 ILJ 896 at 900. 
267 Basson AC, Christianson MA, Garbers G et al Essential Labour Law (2005) 151.  
268 Grogan J Workplace Law 10ed (2009) 272. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Grogan J Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practice 2ed (2007) 440. 
271 Ntshanga v SA Breweries Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1404 (LC) where the dismissal was found to be for 
underperformance.  
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form of dismissal not related to operational requirements.272  Similarly in NUMSA & 
Others v Genlux Lighting (Pty) Ltd,273 the respondent company, contending that it was 
faced with financial and other difficulties relating mainly to absenteeism and theft, 
decided to retrench all 70 of its hourly paid employees. It then outsourced its human 
resources functions to a third party service provider, which employed 63 of the 70 
retrenched employees. These employees continued to do the same jobs and occupied 
the same positions as they had when employed by the company.274 Before the LC, the 
40 applicant employees contended, inter alia, that their dismissal had not been justified 
as their positions were still available after their retrenchment.  The court noted that the 
company had conceded that, after the 70 employees had been dismissed, it had 
brought 63 of them back to do the same work they had previously been engaged in and 
they occupied exactly the same positions.275 The court held that:  
all the evidence indicated that the labour force had been indispensable to the core 
functioning of the company. A need to keep at least 63 employees therefore existed before 
and after the retrenchment, and more employees had been employed thereafter. That 
there had been an economic and structural need to retrench was clearly far from the truth. 
The decision to retrench, when seen against the behavior of the company after the 
retrenchment, was nothing but a sham. The overwhelming evidence showed that the 
retrenchment was not properly and genuinely justified by operational requirements.276  
Even beyond the 2002 amendment to the LRA,277 the courts have not always been 
prepared to lump any form of ‘no-fault’ dismissal into the basket of dismissal for 
                                                            
272 SACWU & Others v Toiletpak Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 295 (IC) where the dismissal was 
found to be for misconduct and had no bearing on operational requirement. See also SAA v Bogopa & 
Others (2007) 11 BLLR 1065 (LAC) at 1066H, where the court held that ‘It is also wrong, in principle, to 
dismiss employees under the guise of operational requirements when the true reason for the dismissal is 
alleged misconduct.’ 
273 (2009) 30 ILJ 654 (LC) 655. 
274 At 655B. 
275 Ibid. 
276 At 655D-E. 
277 See below at 3.8.  
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operational requirements.278 Hence, in Samancor Ltd v Metal & Engineering Industries 
Bargaining Council & Others,279 the employee was dismissed after been detained by the 
police on suspicion of robbery. When he was released from police custody some 137 
days later he returned to work, he discovered that his employer had held a disciplinary 
enquiry in his absence and a decision was taken to dismiss him on the grounds of 
‘operational incapacity’. In declaring the dismissal unfair, Francis J held that:  
Operational incapacity is not recognised in our law and if it did exist it must surely be 
related to ill health or injury. An employer, before dismissing an employee for incapacity, 
must follow the procedures outlined in Item 10 of schedule 8 (the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal).280  
As stated previously,281 when judging the substantive fairness of a dismissal for 
operational requirements, the IC and the former LAC have been reluctant to ‘second 
guess’ managerial decisions leading to retrenchment provided the employer can prove 
that its decision was made in a business-like manner and was bona fide. Similarly, in 
terms of the current LRA, in Kotze v Rebel Discount Group (Pty) Ltd,282  the LAC 
stressed that its function is not to ‘second-guess the commercial and business efficacy 
of the employer’s ultimate decision, but to pass judgment on whether such a decision 
was genuine and not merely a sham.’283 The only check to this managerial prerogative 
was that such a decision must not be accompanied by improper motives.284 This 
position was predicated by the LAC’s belief that they were not the best qualified people 
                                                            
278 Grogan J Dismissal (2010) 344. 
279 (2009) 30 ILJ 389 (LC) 389 H-J. 
280 At 397C.  
281 See above at 2.6.  
282 (2000) 21 ILJ 129 (LAC). 
283 At 133. 
284 Mamabolo & Others v Manchu Consulting CC (1999) 20 ILJ 1826 (LC) 1831. 
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to judge the validity or soundness of a business decision.285 The former LAC even held 
that an employee’s agreement is not required before an employer is entitled to declare a 
position redundant, regardless of whether the position being made redundant was 
created through a collective bargaining agreement or not.286 In this regard, the approach 
of the courts over the years was that the dismissal must conform to procedural fairness 
with little employee’s participation due to the supremacy of managerial prerogative. 
Perhaps this position was justified because the requirement of substantive fairness was 
not codified even by the LRA. Adjudicating the substantive fairness in operational 
requirements therefore depended on the facts of each case. Little wonder that the case 
law approach on substantive fairness dismissal has been quite complex and in majority 
of the decisions assessing the commercial rationale, the courts ‘instinctively look for 
ways of avoiding being drawn into the economic merits of a decision, and the natural 
response has been to give employers a hefty margin of grace in this quarter.’287  
As noted in chapter 2,288 Fagan DJP hearing NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) 
Ltd289 on appeal took the view that, in justifying the substantive fairness in the dismissal 
for operational requirement, the employer must prove that retrenching the employees 
                                                            
285 SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union & Others v Discreto-A Division of Trump & Springbok Holdings 
(1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC) para 8. 
286 BCAWU & another v Murray & Roberts Building (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 ILJ 112 (LAC) 121G. This 
approach had been expressed most vehemently by Van Niekerk SM in these terms: ‘To suggest that a 
general immutable and inflexible rule exists according to which the employee must be fully consulted at 
the first stage, when the decision to retrench is taken, in my view with utmost respect makes for economic 
and business nonsense…It boggles the mind even to have to begin to think about enforced participation 
of shop stewards in delicate negotiations of the kind where some members of the board, even, for 
extreme secrecy are deliberately kept in the dark. On the other extreme, why can I not just shut down my 
small business if I am truly sick and tired of running it. On what conceivable basis can I be forced to 
consult my workers as a prerequisite for doing so.’ TGWU & Others v City Council of the City of Durban & 
another (1991) 12 ILJ 156 (IC) 159A-C. 
287 Thompson C ‘Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirement Dismissal’ (1999) 
20 ILJ 755 at 769. 
288 See 2.7 above. 
289 (1993) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC) 648D. 
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was the only reasonable option in the circumstances leading to the dismissal. The 
decision in this case did not only attack the concept of managerial prerogative, it defied 
the very concept that in assessing the substantive fairness, the courts must show 
deference or not second-guess the business decisions of management and actually 
brought the abstentionist policy to a standstill before the introduction of current LRA.    
The LAC in Atlantis Diesel Engines was in effect stating that for the dismissal to be fair, 
the employer must prove on a balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence 
that its decision to retrench for operational requirement was its measure of last resort.290     
Todd & Damant took the view that the test for fairness as formulated in Atlantis Diesel 
Engines was too exacting291 and taxing on business and that the courts went too far, a 
sentiment shared by Thompson292 in the following expression  
Testing the fairness of a decision does indeed go further than a cursory look at its bona 
fide and commercial rationale. But it surely cannot go as far as setting up the requirement 
that the ‘termination of employment is the only reasonable option in the circumstances’. If 
the decision is based on a demonstrably sensible business analysis that has been probed 
in the consultative process, is not unreasonable in context, nor disproportionate in the 
trade-off between gains and hardships, it should withstand scrutiny. 
However, the test proclaimed by the former LAC in Atlantis Diesel Engines brought into 
the question the functions of the courts in scrutinising the employer’s bona fides in 
dismissal for operational requirements. Subsequent decisions from the courts deviated 
from the Atlantis Diesel’s position and perhaps it was the courts view that it was too 
exacting on employers.  
                                                            
290 Thompson C & Benjamin P South African Labour Law (2006) 473. 
291 Todd C & Damant G (2004) ‘Unfair Dismissal-Operational Requirements’ (2004) 25 ILJ 896 at 902. 
292 Thompson C ‘Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirement Dismissal’ (1999) 
20 ILJ 755 at 770. 
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Three years later, therefore, the LAC in East Rand Propriety Mines Ltd v UPUSA293 
recanted the position proclaimed in Atlantis Diesel that dismissal for operational 
requirement will be fair only as a measure of last resort or the only available option left 
for the retrenching employer. In the case in issue, the court considered an appeal 
against an Industrial Court decision. The dismissed employees in this case were all Zulu 
speaking members of the United Peoples Union of South Africa (UPUSA). Serious 
episodes of violence had occurred in the mines between these workers and members of 
the National Union of Mine Workers. After mine management had made extensive 
efforts to resolve the conflict in the mines, they came to the conclusion that the only way 
to restore peace and full production was to dismiss the minority Zulu grouping on the 
mines.294 They did this on the basis of the operational requirement of the business. 
Cameron J noted that ‘where a dismissal is actuated by operational reasons which arise 
from ethnic or racial hostility, the court will in my view countenance the dismissal only 
where it is satisfied that management not only acted reasonably, but it had no 
alternative to the dismissal’.295 The court found the dismissal to be unfair but refused to 
reinstate the dismissed employees.296 They were awarded compensation. The 
unfairness came from the procedural aspect of the dismissal. Of pertinence here is the 
fact that the court was not in any way prepared to decide the matter on the basis 
whether the employer’s decision was ‘reasonable’ the court concluded that there was no 
alternative left for the employer save dismissal of the employees.297 The test applied by 
                                                            
293 (1996) 17 ILJ 1134 (LAC) 1150. 
294 At 1147. 
295 At 1151B. 
296 The LAC refused to reinstate the employees because their safety could not be guaranteed due to 
ethnic hostility in the mines. 
297 At 1151B. 
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the LAC in this case was not that of scrutiny but that of necessity.298 In Van Rensburg v 
Austen Safe Co299 for example, the LC declined to scrutinise the employer’s decision to 
retrench for operational requirements and found that it was not the role of the court to 
decide which decision in best for an employer to take in a given circumstance. What is 
required, the court maintained, is that the employer must show a fair reason to 
retrench.300 In a language displaying abstention and deference, Revelas J noted: 
The respondent was entitled to restructure its business activities. If the need to restructure 
arises from such an activity and provided the employer followed a fair procedure, it cannot 
be criticised by this court. A court should be mindful not to interfere with the legitimate 
business decision taken by employers who are entitled to profits and even better profit if it 
can be achieved.301 
The learned Judge’s position in the Van Rensburg case supports the view that the role 
of the court in operational requirement dismissal is confined to assessing the fairness of 
the decision to dismissal, but not the business virtue of the restructuring exercise 
including the pursuit of profit. But what of an employer seeking more profit even though 
it is doing well? Will such contemplation be operationally justified on rational grounds to 
an extent that it passes the fairness test under section 188? Revelas J answered this 
question in the case of Hendry v Adcock Ingram,302 when the LC took the view:  
If the employer can show that a good profit is to be made in accordance with a sound 
economic rationale and it follows a fair process to retrench an employee as a result thereof 
it is entitled to retrench. When judging and evaluating an employer’s decision to retrench 
an employee this court must be cautious not to interfere in the legitimate business 
decisions taken by employer’s who are entitled to make a profit and who, in doing so, are 
entitled to restructure their business.303 
There is obviously a higher standard of proof on the employer doing profitably well but 
who desires to do better than an employer at the verge of financial ruin or corporate 
                                                            
298 Grogan J ‘Hobson’s Choice: Firing Workers to save their lives’ (1997) 13 Employment Law 53. 
299 (1998) 19 ILJ 158 (LC). 
300 At 168E. 
301 At 168G-H. 
302 (1998) 19 ILJ 85 (LC). 
303 At 92B-C. 
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collapse. Hence, in NCBAWU & Others v Natural Stone Processors (Pty) Ltd,304 Mpofu 
AJ held that  
The court commented that the legislature has seen fit to attach stringent and peremptory 
requirements to be strictly followed if a retrenchment is to pass muster. This does not take 
away management’s prerogative to restructure its business enterprise. That prerogative 
remains intact even in a case such as the present one where the retrenchment has been 
fueled by the arrival of happy times for the company, as opposed to the usual case where 
the enterprise itself resorts to retrenchment to protect its survival. However, an employer in 
the happy position in the company should possibly be adjudged by a relatively stricter 
standard in relation, for example, to its failure to consider seemingly achievable in-service 
training of its long-serving employees in circumstances where it could easily afford to do 
so.305 
In Benjamin & Others v Plessey Tellumat SA Ltd,306 the respondent employer dismissed 
thirteen employees for operational reasons. The employees instituted proceedings in 
the LC complaining that their dismissals were substantively and procedurally unfair. 
Basson J held that the fact that the retrenchment may have been caused by 
mismanagement was irrelevant in determining the fairness of the dismissal.307 The 
abstentionist approach here may not be different from the former LAC’s position in 
NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd308 when it stated that ‘perhaps management 
has the right to be foolish as long as it is strictly bona fide in its deliberations.’309 
Fairness as stated in section 188 of the LRA is a two way traffic applicable equally to 
both the employer and the employee. A decision that maybe fair to the employer, may 
not be fair to the employee and vice-versa.  
 
 
                                                            
304 (2000) 21 ILJ 1405 (LC). 
305 At 1406A-B. 
306 (1998) 19 ILJ 595 (LC). 
307 At 603H-J.  
308 (1992) 13 ILJ 405 (IC).  
309 At 408A.  
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3.7 The Abstention Approach before the 2002 Amendment 
Amid this paradigm shift from abstention to intervention and back to abstention, the LAC 
in SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union v Discreto-A division of Trump & Springbok 
Holdings,310 following the enactment of the current LRA, appeared to dispose decisively 
of the approach of its predecessor, asserting in effect that the substance of an 
employer’s decision to dismiss, provided it is based on actual operational reasons, falls 
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.311 The view of the court as to what constitute 
fairness and its role was expressly summed up by Froneman DJP: 
The function of the court in scrutinising the consultative process is not to second-guess the 
commercial or business efficacy of the employer’s ultimate decision (an issue on which it 
is, generally, not qualified to pronounce upon), but to pass judgment whether the ultimate 
decision arrived at was genuine and not merely a sham (the kind of issue which courts are 
called upon to do, in different settings, every day).The manner in which the court adjudges 
the later issue is to enquire whether the legal requirements for a proper consultation 
process has been followed and, if so, whether the ultimate decision arrived at by the 
employer is operationally and commercially justifiable on rational grounds, having regard to 
what emerged from the consultation process. It is important to note that when determining 
the rationality of the employer’s ultimate on retrenchment, it is not the court’s function to 
decide whether it was the best decision under the circumstances, but only whether it was a 
rational commercial or operational decision, properly taking into account what emerged 
during the consultation process.312 
The position of the court in this matter did not only depart from the position that 
retrenchment should be the ‘measure of last resort’ adopted by the former LAC in 
Atlantis Diesel Engines, but it revived the abstentionist (deference) position long 
adopted by the courts.  Apart from articulating the unwillingness of the courts to probe 
the commercial rationale of employers’ decision to dismiss for operational requirements, 
                                                            
310 (1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC). See also SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox (Pty) Ltd (2003)24 ILJ 1917 
(LAC) at para 43 where the court took the view that dismissal need not be a measure of last resort and 
the court need not find the dismissal unfair just because the employer could have implemented 
alternatives without folding up.  
311 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirement Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 595 at 599. 
312 At para 8. See also Decision Surveys International (Pty) Ltd v Dlamini & Others (1999) 5 BLLR 413 
(LAC) para 27. 
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it re-invented the abstentionist approach. By abdicating its role to interrogate the 
commercial rationale proffered by the employer in assessing fairness in operational 
requirement dismissal, the court ignored the hardship of affected employees who bore 
the brunt of retrenchments.313  
Just one year after he handed down the decision in Discreto under the former LRA, 
Froneman DJP, in the case of SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd314 had the 
opportunity to apply the new LRA in a new democratic and free South Africa with a new 
constitution. Given the new realities, the court was obviously required to do more.315  In 
a sharp departure from his previous ruling in Discreto, the learned Judge took the view 
that: 
It can no longer be said that the court’s function in scrutinising the consultation process in 
dismissal for operational requirement is merely to determine the good faith of the employer. 
The matter is now one of proof by the employer on a balance of probability of- 
 The cause or reason for the dismissal; 
 The defined operational requirements that the dismissal was based on; 
 A fair procedure in accordance with section 189; 
 The facts upon which a finding of a substantively fair reason for the dismissal can be 
made…….. 
[D]ismissal should at least not be the first resort, even though the LRA does not expressly 
state that dismissal should only be used as a last resort when dismissing for operational 
requirement.316 
Commenting on the LAC’s decision in the Afrox case, Grogan noted that,  
the court was stating here that the requirement that a dismissal for operational reason must 
be “substantively fair” does not mean that the retrenchment can only be used as a 
                                                            
313 See Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) where 
at para 70, Zondo JP likened retrenchment to a ‘death penalty in the field of labour and employment law’ 
and in General Food Industries Ltd v FAWU (2004) 25 ILJ 1260 (LAC) at para 55, Nicholson AJA referred 
to the impact of retrenchment on workers and their families as ‘deleterious.’   
314 (1999)  20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
315 Thompson C & Benjamin P South African Labour Law (2006) 473. 
316 SACWU & Others v Afrox Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC) para 38-41. 
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measure of last resort. Although the court did not elaborate, it apparently had in mind the 
debate over the test for the dismissal of legal strikers under the 1956 LRA. If that is so, the 
court appears to have been saying that employers need neither wait, nor prove, that their 
businesses were on the verge of collapse before resorting to retrenchment.317  
The court was of the opinion that in retrenchment cases, dismissal must not be the first 
option but certainly not the last option and that it will scrutinise the employer’s bona 
fides but that it will not find it unfair just because the employer could have implemented 
alternatives without shutting down.  
The LAC’s approach in both Discreto and Afrox regarding the issue of substantive 
fairness in operational requirement dismissal evince not much difference in that in both 
cases, the court was unprepared to interrogate the commercial rationale of the 
employer and the court was not concerned if there were alternatives to dismissal. 
Jammy AJ, deciding Steyn & Others v Driefontein Consolidated Ltd t/a West 
Driefontein,318  had little problems in pursuing this same path (avoiding to interrogate 
the employer’s bona fides) when he expressed the following 
It is the employer’s prerogative, provided that it is exercised rationally….to determine…the 
objectives of its business operations. The competitive challenges prevailing in the 
commercial sphere will invariably be differently assessed and addressed from enterprise to 
enterprise and how this is done will inevitably bear emphatically on the success or failure of 
the business concerned. The role of this court is not one of judgmental business consultant 
or adviser and it will not readily presume to dictate or prescribe to commercial sophisticates 
or industry captains how they should direct or manage their business affairs.319   
Three years after Discreto, the LAC operating under the current LRA expressed some 
doubts in BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union320  as to 
whether the degree of deference inherent in the approach taken in Discreto was 
                                                            
317 Grogan J Dismissal (2010) 357. 
318 (2001) 22 ILJ 231 (LC) para 30. See also Kotze v Rebel Discount Liquor Group (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 
129 (LAC). 
319 Referring to Mamabolo & Others v Manchu Consulting CC (1999) 20 ILJ 1826 (LC) 1831. See also, 
Cohen T (2003) ‘The Reasonable Employer’s Test-Creeping in Through the Back Door?’ 15 SAMercLJ 
201. 
320 (2001) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC).  
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appropriate in the light of the requirement that a dismissal must be for a fair reason. In 
essence, the test enunciated in Discreto followed the approach of judicial review of 
administrative action enunciated by Froneman DJP in Carephone namely that ‘the 
courts should afford administrative bodies a significant margin of appreciation and not 
evaluate their actions in terms of value judgments impose upon the activities of such 
bodies’321 and concluded that ‘as long as the judge determining the issue is aware that 
he or she enters the merits not in order to substitute his or her own opinion on the 
correctness thereof but to determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable, the 
process will be in order.’322 The deferential approach in Discreto was not followed in this 
case. The court expressed its reservation with this approach when Davis AJA held that 
I have some doubts as to whether this deferential approach which is sourced in the 
principles of administrative review is equally applicable to a decision by an employer to 
dismiss employees particularly in the light of the section of the Act ,  namely, “the reason 
for the dismissal is a fair reason”. The word “fair” introduces a comparator that is a reason 
which must be fair to both parties affected by the decision. The starting point is whether 
there is a commercial rationale for the dismissal. But rather than take such a decision at 
face value, a court is entitled to examine whether the particular decision is also fair to the 
affected party, namely, the employees to be retrench. To this extent the court is entitled to 
inquire as to whether a reasonable basis exist on which the decision, including the 
proposed manner, to dismiss for operational requirement is predicated. Viewed 
accordingly, the test becomes less deferential and the court is entitled to examine the 
contents of the reasons given by the employer, albeit that the inquiry is not directed to 
whether the reason offered is the one which would have been chosen by the court. 
Fairness, not correctness, is the mandated test.323 
The court, in Discreto, went further to state that the substance of the employer’s 
decision to dismiss, provided it is based on actual operational reason and complies with 
procedural fairness, falls beyond the jurisdiction of the court.324  
                                                            
321 BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union (2001) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC) para 18.  
322 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC) 1435.  
323  BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union (2001) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC) para 19. 
324 SACTWU & Others v Discreto (1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC) 1455B-C. 
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The position of both the LC and LAC on substantive fairness in dismissal for operational 
requirements from Atlantis Diesel Engines to BMD Knitting Mills has shown that when 
adjudicating the fairness in retrenchment cases, the courts have been unwilling to 
scrutinise the commercial rationale proffered by the employer for dismissal. Albeit the 
decision in BMD Knitting Mills mentioned fairness, it did not seem to reconcile it with the 
hardship of the employees who will be retrenched. By not scrutinising every alternative 
route available to the employer to determine which option would have lessened the 
hardship on the affected parties, the courts maintained a deferential approach in 
assessing the substantive fairness or otherwise in dismissal for operational 
requirements. 
 3.8 The Introduction of Section 189A and the application of the law after the 2002 
Amendment of the LRA 
The unpredictability displayed by the various court decisions as to the role of the courts 
in scrutinising the employer’s commercial decision to retrench for operational 
requirement became lessened by the introduction of section 189A into the LRA 
following the 2002 amendment. Section 189A was actually designed to cater for larger 
retrenchments and it imposes procedural obligations under section 189A(2) to (5) and 
substantive obligations under section 189A(19). These obligations apply if an employer 
with between 50 and 200 employees contemplate dismissing more than 10 employees, 
or 20 or more employees in the case of employers with a total work force of between 
200 and 300, 30 or more employees in the case of an employer with a work force of 
between 300 and 400, 40 or more employees in the case of an employer with a work 
force of between 400 and 500, or 50 or more employees in the case of an employer with 
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a work force of more than 500 employees.325 On the aspect of the substantive fairness 
in dismissal for operational requirement, section 189 A (19) of the Act provides that: 
In any dispute referred to the Labour Court in terms of section 191 (5) (b) (ii) that concerns 
the dismissal of the number of employees specified in subsection (1), the Labour Court must 
find that the employee was dismissed for a fair reason if- 
a) the dismissal was to give effect to a requirement based on the employer’s economic, 
technological, structural and similar needs; 
b) the dismissal was operationally justifiable on rational grounds; 
c) there was a proper consideration of alternatives, and; 
d) selection criteria were fair and objective. 
Since the 2002 amendment came into force, there is now a distinction between small-
scale and large-scale retrenchments. Before the amendment of 2002, all retrenchments 
were regulated by the same yard stick but after the introduction of section 189A, 
separate sets of rules are now in place to regulate small and large scale retrenchment. 
The content of section 189A, apart from regulating large-scale retrenchment, also 
places more obligations to an employer contemplating retrenchment as seen in sub-
section (19).  It is trite that an employer is permitted to dismiss for its operational 
requirements. However, for the employer to do so successfully, it is obliged to have a 
bona fide economic rationale for the dismissal and to comply with the provisions of 
section 189 as well as section 189A of the Act where applicable.326 The employer must 
prove as well that the dismissal embraces the purport of section 213 or falls within the 
confines of any of its indicators and that there was proper consideration of alternatives. 
It is worth noting that section 189A does not provide expressly or tacitly that the 
alternative selected by the employer must be the best option in the opinion of the court 
                                                            
325 Section 189A(1)(a). See also Thembu MA ‘Dismissal for Operational Requirements’ (2003) 15 
SAMercLJ at 351. 
326 Super Group Supply Chain Partners v Dlamini & another (2013) 34 ILJ 108 (LAC) para 24.  
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or must be the only available measure to be taken by an employer contemplating 
dismissal for operational requirement. Thus, retrenchment which would have the effect 
of increasing the profitability or efficiency of a business has been regarded as fair, 
provided that the employer is able to prove that alternatives to dismissal were 
considered prior to taking the decision to dismiss.327 
Section 189A(19), therefore, defines the notion of ‘fair reason’ for dismissal based on 
operational requirement. The only question here now that begs clarity is did subsection 
(19) of section 189A adequately resolve the legal uncertainty in the substantive fairness 
in the dismissal for operational requirement? Such adequacy or otherwise will be 
answered by this mini-thesis. Thompson and Benjamin write that for the substantive 
dismissal for operational requirement to be fair after the 2002 amendment,  
the employer must go beyond showing that the decision was rational or it fell within a band 
of commercially defensible options-something more taxing than an administrative law-type 
review is envisaged. But the court or arbitrator will not require the employer to share their 
specific conception of the best and fairest solution in the circumstances. Nor will they 
oblige the employer to demonstrate that dismissal was the only realistic option (although 
some of the court decisions seem to raise this high bar); it will suffice if the dismissal 
decision was fair enough in all the circumstances and all viable alternatives were properly 
considered.328  
It has been suggested that  
[s]ection 189A prescribes the manner in which the employer must have addressed the 
issue during consultation. “Proper consideration” entails more than merely considering the 
alternatives tabled by both the employer and employees during consultation. It entails that 
the employer must apply its mind and give defendable reasons for dismissing all these 
alternatives and finally deciding that dismissal was the only option. The employer must, in 
essence, convince the Labour Court that dismissal was the measure of last resort.329 
                                                            
327 Grogan J Dismissal (2002) 226. 
328 Thompson C & Benjamin P South African Labour Law (2006) 465. 
329 Basson AC, Christianson M, Garbers C et al Essential Labour Law 5ed (2005) 154. 
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While section 189A is applicable only to disputes falling within the ambit of section 189, 
it is submitted that it establishes a uniform benchmark which the courts are likely to 
apply more generally in the context of operational requirement dismissals.330 
The substantive fairness in dismissal for operational requirements maybe easy to justify 
in circumstances where the employer’s business is running at a financial loss or facing a 
down turn in the demand of its goods and services. The question in many retrenchment 
cases is whether an employer can prove that dismissal is necessary in cases where it 
has to retrench not to stem losses, but to increase profits.331 Can a case for 
retrenchment be made out in these circumstances too even after the introduction of 
section 189A?  
In Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of SA & Others,332 decided 
after the 2002 amendment of the LRA, the LAC accepted a retrenchment to increase 
profits as a fair reason to justify dismissal for operational requirement.333 Fry’s Metals 
‘concerned the stuff of a fairly common contest in the workplace whereby an employer 
wanted to change its work practices and labour cost structure in order to protect its 
viability and to improve its competitiveness.’334 Specifically, the employer wanted to 
change the shift system and to do away with a transport allowance. The workers 
concerned, assisted by the union, resisted and the employer threatened to dismiss them 
                                                            
330 See SATAWU v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co. SA Ltd (2005) 4 BLLR 378 (LC) 403 at para 85 where 
Murphy AJ  applies section 189 A(19)(b) to dismissals not subject to Section 189 A. 
331 Grogan J, Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices 2ed (2007) 441. 
332 (2003) 2 BLLR 140 (LAC). 
333 At 141.  
334 Thompson C ‘Bargaining over Business Imperative: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals’ 
(2006) 27 ILJ 705 at 707.  
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if they did not agree to the proposed changes.335 At first implicit and finally explicit in the 
threat was the proposition of the employer that if it could not get the changes it sought 
by a coerced agreement, it would retrench the resisting workers and replace them with 
employees who are prepared to work on its terms. When words hardened into deeds, 
the union and its members turned to the LC and obtained an order restraining the 
retrenchment.336 Their essential argument was that the employer could not invoke the 
power option of dismissal to get its way in the bargaining process.337 While it is true that 
they pinned their hopes on the narrow platform of section 187(1)(c) of the LRA providing 
that a dismissal will be automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is to ‘compel 
the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
the employer and the employee’, the scaffolding in section 187(1)(c) is not a strong one 
in this case, because if the dismissal will be permanent, it will not offend section 
187(1)(c) of the LRA.338 On appeal, Zondo JP held that the dismissal for a profit 
oriented reason within the context of operational requirement was fair as it falls squarely 
in the financial reason as contemplated in section 213 of the LRA.339 Dealing with the 
proposition that an employer may not dismiss for operational reasons purely for the 
purpose of making profits as opposed to resorting to dismissal in order to ensure the 
survival of the business or undertaking, Zondo JP disposed of it as follows: 
That argument has no statutory basis in our law. This is so because all that the Act refers 
to, and recognise, in this regard is an employer’s right to dismiss for a reason based on its 
operational requirements without making any distinction between operational requirement 
                                                            
335 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others (2003) 2 BLLR 140 (LAC) 140. 
336 At 140. 
337 At 148.  
338 Cheadle H, Le Roux PAK, Thompson C et al Current Labour Law 4ed (2005) 54. 
339 Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others (2003) 2 BLLR 140 (LAC) 152. 
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in the context of a business the survival of which is under threat and a business which is 
making profit and wants to make more profit.340 
The for-profit retrenchment therefore survived both the previous LRA of 1956 and the 
current LRA judging by the court’s decision in the Fry’s Metals case. 
3.8.1 The Interventionist Approach after the 2002 Amendment  
In deciding Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax,341 the LAC adopted a different 
view and reasoned that showing deference to the employer’s decision to retrench will 
amount to the court abdicating its role and allowing the employer to decide whether its 
own conduct is fair or not, a role clearly assigned to the courts.342 In Algorax, it should 
be noted, the dismissals were found to be automatically unfair; the comments quoted 
were therefore obiter. Nevertheless, as it will appear, the LC subsequently tended to 
treat the comments as authoritative statements of the law.343 They must therefore be 
given their due weight.344 In adopting the view that the LAC will no longer follow a 
deferential approach and rejecting the notion that the court will not have the business 
knowledge which the employer possess in resolving issues at the work place, Zondo JP 
observed 
Sometimes it is said that a court should not be critical of the solution that an employer has 
decided in order to resolve a problem in its business because it normally will not have the 
business knowledge or expertise which the employer as a business person may have to 
deal with problems in the work place. This is true. However, it is not absolute and should 
not be taken too far. When either the labour court or this court is seized with a dispute of 
the dismissal, it has to determine the fairness of the dismissal objectively. The question 
whether the dismissal is fair or not must be answered by the court. The court must not 
defer to the employer for the purpose of answering that question. In other words it cannot 
                                                            
340 Fry’s Metals(Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others (2003) 2 BLLR 140 (LAC) 153. 
341 (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). 
342 At 1930F-H. 
343  See FAWU v SA Breweries (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC) in 3.8.2 below where the LC followed the 
interventionist approach in Algorax. 
344 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirements Dismissal: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 595 at 599. 
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say that the employer think it is fair, and therefore, it is or should be fair…… Furthermore, 
the court should not hesitate to deal with an issue which requires no special expertise, 
skills or knowledge that it does not have but simply requires common sense or logic.345 
Recognising the negative impact that dismissal has on employees and their families 
especially the ‘no-fault dismissal’, Zondo JP continued:  
The respondent’s problem required simple common sense and did not involve any 
complicated business transaction or decision. Accordingly, where, as in this case, the 
employer has chosen a solution that results in a dismissal or in dismissals of a number of 
employees when there is an obvious and clear way in which it could have addressed the 
problem without any employee losing their jobs or with fewer job losses, and the court is 
satisfied, after hearing the employer on such a solution, that it can work,  the court should 
not hesitate to deal with the matter on the basis of the employer using that solution which 
preserves jobs rather than one which causes job losses. This is especially so because 
resort to dismissal especially a so-called no-fault dismissal, which some regard as the 
death penalty in the field of labour and employment law, is meant to be a measure of last 
resort…346  
This pronouncement heralded a more interventionist approach. Is this interventionist 
position similar in scrutiny to the former LAC decision in Atlantis Diesel Engines? 
Without taking the view that retrenchment in operational requirement dismissal should 
be a ‘measure of last resort’, it will seem that some subsequent decisions post Algorax 
see it as thus.347 It seems that the approach adopted by the LAC is that, it will intervene 
and declare the dismissal unfair only when common sense indicates that the employer 
could have realised its operational goals by choosing an option that would avoid 
retrenchment or reduced the number of dismissals. Perhaps the court was here 
denouncing the long revered concept of managerial prerogative to the effect that 
business decisions are at best known and made by corporate captains and that the 
courts are ‘are generally not qualified to pronounce on commercial decisions.’348 By 
                                                            
345 At paras 69-70. 
346 At para 70. 
347 See County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v OCGAWU & another (2003) 7 BLLR 647 (LAC) at para 27 where 
the LAC went so far as to state that ‘to justify the retrenchment of a particular employee, the employer 
must show that the dismissal of the employee could not be avoided.’ 
348 SACTWU & others v Discreto (1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC) para 8. 
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adopting a less deferential approach in Algorax, Zondo JP revived the more 
interventionist approach in scrutinising the reasons advanced by the employer in 
operational requirement dismissal adopted by the former LAC in Atlantis Diesel 
Engines.349  
The decision in Algorax was taken the same year as Fry’s Metals and by the same 
judge but Fry’s Metals was decided earlier. The approach adopted in Algorax was that 
of full scrutiny of the employer’s reasons for dismissal and had Fry’s Metals been 
decided after Algorax, it could have failed the fairness test because dismissal for profit 
cannot be a measure of last resort. 
In Fry’s Metals, the learned judge widened the managerial prerogative of employers by 
the inclusion of the ingredient of profit in the scope of financial reasons to justify fairness 
in operational requirements dismissal. Du Toit has suggested that ‘if in the Algorax line 
of decisions the LAC appeared to go to new lengths in protecting employees against 
dismissal for operational reasons, in Fry’s Metals it appeared to lean in the opposite 
direction.’350 By accepting in Fry’s Metals that an employer can fairly dismiss employees 
for operational requirement even to increase profit, the court, one can say, abandoned 
the element of necessity in that the business efficacy to dismiss is left for the employer 
to determine rather than for the court to ascertain. This position in Fry’s Metals which 
amounted to deference is perhaps a return to Discreto and an endorsement of Afrox, 
the era of abstention. 
                                                            
349 See above at 2.7. 
350 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirements Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 595 at 605. 
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The profit justification to fairly dismiss employees for operational reasons as seen in 
Fry’s Metals was still held by the minority in the Algorax case to be good law. Although 
the majority judgment delivered by Zondo JP in Algorax re-introduced the ‘measure of 
last resort’ formula in operational requirements dismissal, the minority judgment was still 
in favour of the fact that increasing profit as a financial operational factor should be fair 
enough to justify dismissal for operational requirement. In delivering the minority 
judgment in Algorax, Hlope AJA (as he then was) proclaimed in dissent; 
The necessity to effect changes in order for a business to be more viable or to improve 
efficiency therein falls within the ambit of operational requirement.351 
While it may be true that the ‘for-profit dismissal’ sanctioned in Fry’s Metals could ‘open 
the floodgates virtually at will’, the link between a dismissal and the employer’s 
operational needs must still pass the test of fairness.352 In looking at the difficulties 
inherent in this for-profit position, Du Toit poses the question in this way  
Will it be ‘fair’ in the given circumstances to dismiss employees in order to increase profit or 
efficiency? At which point does an employer’s right to seek ‘more profit’ outweigh 
employees’ right not to be dismissed unfairly, and how must that be measured?353 
Although Fry’s Metals never addressed this question since it was not a fact in issue, 
Algorax perhaps answered the question by taking the view that dismissal for operational 
requirements will only be fair as ‘measure of last resort.’354 It may be difficult for an 
employer to prove that the desire to increase profit was its measure of last resort 
justifying dismissal for operational requirements. The reason for the ‘measure of last 
resort’ test espoused in Algorax was according to Du Toit 
                                                            
351 At para 46. 
352 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and Operational Requirement Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 595 at 606.  
353 Ibid. See also Grogan J ‘Chicken or Egg? Dismissal to Enforce Demands’ (2003) 19 Employment Law 
2.  
354 Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) para 70.  
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a reflection of the acute societal concern about mass unemployment and job losses 
prevailing in the era of Algorax. On the face of it, certainly, the ruling that dismissal is only 
permissible as a ‘measure of last resort’ appears to arm the court with powers of 
prohibiting job losses along the lines demanded by labour during the negotiations leading 
up to the 2002 amendments to the LRA. But it may also be said to reflect an ongoing 
judicial concern to make sense of a complex requirement of the law-the requirement that a 
dismissal based on operational needs must have a “fair” reason, to be tested in the 
consultation process against criteria such as alternatives to dismissal-which, arguably, had 
previously been given insufficient weight.355  
Amid this legal uncertainty between Fry’s Metals and Algorax, how has the law of 
substantive fairness in operational dismissal been applied subsequently? 
3.8.2 The application of the law beyond Algorax 
In NUMSA & others v Dorbyl Ltd & another,356 Fulton AJ adopted the following view 
regarding the judgment in Algorax: 
With respect, I think that the Algorax decision is somewhat anomalous if one considers that 
the Labour Appeal Court in 2003 accept that there is nothing in the LRA which precludes 
an employer from retrenching employees in order to increase profits (Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd 
v NUMSA & others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC); [2003] 2 BLLR 140 (LAC). Mr. Van der Riet 
[counsel for NUMSA] did not contend that an employer must be on the brink of insolvency 
before it is entitled to retrench employees. He said that he understood the ‘last resort’ 
requirement in the Algorax decision to mean that an employer must show that 
retrenchments were necessary. Be that as it may, the court in Algorax did not mention, 
even obliquely, the Afrox decision and therefore in my view cannot be taken to have 
overturned that decision.357 
 
By applying Afrox358 and not Algorax in this case, Fulton AJ upheld Afrox as good law. 
In Food and Allied Workers Union & Others v SA Breweries Ltd,359 the LC applied a 
stricter test of fairness in dismissal for operational requirements. In this case, the court 
was faced with a situation where the employer, in an effort to become a world class 
                                                            
355 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 595 at 611. 
356 (2004) 25 ILJ 1300 (LC). 
357 At para 4.1.5. 
358 Discussed above at 3.7. 
359 (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC). 
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manufacturer so as to compete globally and to protect its local market against 
international competition, proposed a skill-based workplace agreement, declared all 
positions in its Newlands brewery redundant, job descriptions were re-defined, invited 
all former employees to re-apply, some who re-applied and met the skill-based 
requirements were re-employed, others who did not meet the requirements and those 
who did not re-apply, were retrenched.360 In this case, Gamble AJ addressed the 
contrast between Discreto and Algorax and elected to follow Algorax.361 When counsel 
for respondent argued against the ‘measure of last resort’ approach in Algorax and 
contended that Algorax did not lay down general principles, Gamble AJ took the view 
that 
I cannot agree with Mr. Gauntlett (Counsel for SA Breweries) on this score. The dictum in 
the Algorax case is one of general application and is based on a thorough analysis of s 189 
(2) (a) (i) and (ii) read with subsection (3) (a) and (b).362  
FAWU v SA Breweries was decided along the lines of Algorax and so, as of 2004, 
Algorax was upheld as the relevant position to be followed in assessing the substantive 
fairness in dismissal for operational requirements.  
The more interventionist approach entertained in Algorax was even broadened 
subsequently in Enterprise Food (Pty) Ltd v Allen & Others.363 In this case, the 
employer’s decision to close down a particular operation at Montague Gardens in the 
Cape Town region, rendering several hundred workers redundant, was over-turned by 
the LAC on both substantive and procedural grounds. The court was especially critical 
                                                            
360 At para 12. 
361 Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 595 at 608. 
362 At para 43.  
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of the fact that the employer was unable to explain how the shareholder’s profits of 25% 
which motivated the closure decision, was arrived at. Davis AJA stated 
The court must examine whether there is a fair reason to dismiss. If, as Zondo JP noted in 
Algorax, there are two rational solutions, one of which preserve jobs, fairness as mandated 
by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the Act) dictates that this is the solution that must 
be adopted by the employer (at para 70).364   
The LAC’s decision here demonstrates that it is ready to scrutinise the employer’s 
rationale for dismissal and would not hesitate to set it aside if there is alternative to that 
dismissal. This builds on the previous decision of the LAC in County Fair Foods (Pty) 
Ltd v OCGAWU & another,365  where the LAC even went further in its scrutiny of the 
employer’s reason to dismiss for operational requirement and took the following view: 
In terms of the Act once it has been established that a dismissal occurred, the employer 
bears the onus to prove that there was a fair reason for the dismissal. If the employer relies 
on operational requirements to show the existence of a fair reason to dismiss, he must 
show that the dismissal of the employees could not be avoided. That is why both the 
employer and the employee or his representatives are required by section 189 of the Act to 
explore the possibilities of avoiding the employee’s dismissal.366 
Without actually referring to the decision in Algorax, Nicholson AJA in General Food 
Industries Ltd v FAWU367 summarised the employer’s position in this way 
After consultations have been exhausted the employer must decide whether to proceed 
with the retrenchment or not. The loss of jobs through retrenchment has such a deleterious 
impact on the life of workers and their families that is imperative that, even though reasons 
to retrench employees may exist, they will only be accepted as valid if the employer can 
show that all viable alternative steps have been considered and taken to prevent the 
retrenchment or to limit this to a minimum.368 
In establishing a defensible case on the substantive fairness in operational 
requirements dismissal therefore, the employer’s decision to retrench must be valid in 
that all viable alternatives have been considered and that the ultimate decision must be 
                                                            
364 At para 17. 
365 (2003) 7 BLLR 647 (LAC). 
366 At para 27. 
367 (2004) 7 BLLR 667 (LAC). 
368 At para 55. See also Du Toit D ‘Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissals: 
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fair to the employee as well. In making this decision, its implications for the employee 
must be taken into consideration for that decision to stand scrutiny. Hence, in Food and 
Allied Workers Union & Others v SA Breweries,369 an employer who went all out to 
ensure that the decision to dismiss was at least fair to the retrenched employees was 
still found wanting. But on the other hand, there are decisions like Mazista Tiles (Pty) 
Ltd v NUM &Others,370 where the employer appears to have come off rather lightly, 
having only ‘proved competitiveness as one of the reasons for the dismissal’ under 
section 188 of the Act.371  
However, in Forecourt Express (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union & 
Others,372  the LAC did not follow the Algorax approach. In this case, the employer took 
over the business of another motor transport company as a going concern and 
management informed the majority union that it intended to restructure its operations.373  
The union argued that Forecourt Express could not retrench the transferred employees 
because their contracts of employment had transferred to Forecourt Express in terms of 
section 197 of the LRA. After further consultations, the union proposed that the 
retrenchments be deferred for six months. That proposal was rejected and the 55 
respondent employees were retrenched. The LC found that their dismissal was both 
substantively and procedurally unfair.374  On appeal, the LAC was not unanimous in 
their decision. The majority judgment delivered by Zondo JP observed that, while a 
retrenchment maybe unfair if it can be avoided by adopting an alternative plan, the 
                                                            
369 (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC). 
370 (2005) 3 BLLR 219 (LAC). 
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union had not suggested any alternative plan other than suggesting a postponement to 
the retrenchment.375  The majority found itself in no position to judge whether the 
business should have been run differently for that period, which the minority judgment 
delivered by Mlambo AJA concluded was the case.376  In the dissenting judgment, 
Mlambo AJA held that, the employer had acted unfairly in refusing to defer the 
retrenchments. The dismissals, he concluded, ‘were clearly not a measure of last resort 
and that rendered them substantively unfair.’377   
The majority judgment in this case revived the doctrine of abstention where the courts 
generally declined to second guess the employers decision. The majority held the view 
that the court is not qualified to tell the employer how to manage and direct its operation 
when adjudicating the fairness or otherwise of decision to retrench for operational 
requirements.378 Mlambo AJA in a minority judgment is of the view that  
the courts retain the power to decree whether anything done by the employer in the name 
of business alignment or restructuring which lead to loss of jobs was fair. The 
determination of whether this was fair entails an examination of the reasons relied on to 
undertake the restructuring.379  
These are two fundamentally different views in assessing an employer’s rationale to 
dismiss for operational requirements. On the one hand, in this case, the majority 
position represented the abstentionist approach and the minority, on the other hand, 
represented the interventionist approach. There was clearly disagreement on the 
assessment of the substantive fairness in dismissal for operational requirements. 
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 In NUMSA & Others v Genlux Lighting (Pty) Ltd,380 the respondent suffered losses as a 
result of poor productivity, absenteeism, theft, cheaper import commodities from the far 
east and the volatile Rand-Dollar exchange rate.381 The respondent decided to retrench 
its entire production staff and engaged the services of a temporary employment agent to 
administer all recruitment and employment related duties. Sixty-three of the 70 
employees were re-employed who continued doing the same work as they had done 
prior to their retrenchment.382 The LC under Cele AJ accepted that the company had 
suffered severe losses through theft. However, the solution it had chosen was not a 
proper dismissal for operational requirements. Each of the 40 applicants seeks 
reinstatement with retrospective effect from the date of dismissal and on terms and 
conditions which were applicable at the time of their dismissal.383  The court stated: 
A need to keep at least the 63 employees existed before and after their retrenchment. That 
there were economic and structural needs due to restructuring of human resources, 
productivity processes and downsizing to affect the 63 employees is clearly far from the 
truth. The economic decline and financial difficulties faced by the respondent did not stop it 
from taking back the services of the 63 employees in the same positions and the doing the 
same work. The reasons advanced for retrenchment when seen against the behavior of 
the respondent after retrenchment show that the decision to retrench was nothing but a 
sham. The overwhelming evidence shows that the retrenchment was not properly and 
genuinely justified by operational requirements. The decision to retrench was undoubtedly 
not a reasonable option in the circumstances.384 
In this case, the court was less differential and it was prepared to look beyond the 
losses sustained by employer.  
The different views taken in the cases above of course do not mean that the law on 
substantive fairness for operational requirements is in disarray, but it is definitely 
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uncertain. In highlighting the unpredictability in this area of operational requirements 
dismissal, Thompson and Benjamin explain as follows: 
The uncertainty factor does not mean that the law is disarray. Section 188 and 189 along 
with the relevant code and the case law offer considerable guidance, and generally 
speaking the parties know what is their due and what is expected of them. It is only the 
really tough nuts that are hard to crack in advance. Though greater statutory precision may 
bring greater certainty, it may come at the price of justice. The marginal cases are 
identifiable as such at the point they become full blown disputes, and then the parties 
should look hard at alternatives form of dispute resolution-facilitation under creative terms 
of reference, mediation coupled with recommendations, pre-emptive arbitration and the 
like-rather than weather out their chances in inevitable protracted appeal processes.385 
Thompson and Benjamin were here proposing recommendations and at the same time 
painting a bleak but true picture of the law on substantive fairness in operational 
requirement dismissal. While it may be true that despite the statutory expectation 
imported into this area of the law by section 189A(19), one thing remain abundantly 
clear, some decisions as seen above did not follow the stricter approach in Algorax.386  
3.9 Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter, it is shown that there was no statutory provision of substantive fairness 
in operational requirements dismissal when the LRA came into force in 1996. With the 
introduction of section 189A in August 2002, the law on substantive fairness in 
operational requirement dismissal became regulated by statute. The courts on their 
part, did not adopt a consistent approach in adjudicating dismissal for operational 
requirements. The various cases examined in this chapter, proved the uncertainty in this 
area of the law. 
                                                            
385 Thompson C & Benjamin P South African Labour Law (2006) 476. 
386 See also NUMSA & Others v Dorbyl Ltd & another (2004) 25 ILJ 1300(LC) at para 4.1.5 where the 
Labour Court did not follow the approach in Algorax.   
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 Chapter 4 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1   Conclusions 
The purpose of this mini-thesis is to assess the substantive fairness in the dismissal for 
operational requirements and to determine why the various statutes and judicial 
decisions have not succeeded to bring this area of the law into certainty. In order to 
achieve this objective, this mini-thesis assessed the substantive fairness in operational 
requirement dismissal from both statutory and case law perspectives. 
The substantive aspect of the dismissal for operational requirements has posed a lot of 
challenges in both statutory and case law to an extent that it was imperative to diagnose 
this inherent controversy, state the law as it stands today and to propose possible 
recommendations that may help approach this area of the law into some consistency. 
Eighteen years into the LRA, can anyone say with certainty that the law on the 
substantive fairness for operational requirements dismissal has attained certainty? The 
answer is no. The conclusion therefore is set out in these two findings summarised 
below with possible recommendations.  
4.1.1 Statutory Findings 
Statutory enactments in the field of labour law could be traced in chronology from the 
Cape Servants Registry Act of 1906, the Mines and Works Act of 1911, The Factories 
Act of 1918, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 which was actually the predecessor 
to the LRA of 1956. While all these acts on the one hand had their impact and relevance 
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on the development of labour law, they fell short of addressing dismissal issues in 
general, let alone operational requirements dismissal.387 The need for statutes in this 
area of the law was necessitated by the shortcomings of the common law.388  
It was the recommendation of the Wiehahn Commission of 1979 that revolutionised 
labour law and by implication the law on dismissal. After the recommendation of the 
Wiehahn Commission therefore, the Industrial Court was established389 alongside its 
unfair labour practice jurisdiction390 with the coming into force of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. Although this act contained no express provision of unfair dismissal, it 
was soon accepted that the definition of unfair practice was broad enough to 
encompass it.391 Of greater significance was the passing of the 1988 amendment to the 
LRA of 1956 which introduced the concept of unfair dismissal including some elements 
of substantive fairness.392 
The concept of operational requirement dismissal was derived from the ILO Convention 
158.393  Operational requirements dismissal is defined by section 213 of the current LRA 
as one of the accepted grounds of dismissal in terms of section 188. The amendment of 
August 2002 to the LRA brought in the new section 189A. This amended section 
addressed the question of the substantive fairness in dismissal for operational 
requirements especially in large scale retrenchments.394 
                                                            
387 See above at 2.4. 
388  See above at 2.3.  
389 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation Part 1 RP 47/1979 IV para 4.6.  
390 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation Part 1 RP 47/1979 V para 4.127. 20.  
391 See above at 2.4.  
392 See above at 2.4. 
393 Termination of Employment Convention 158 of 1982. 
394 See above at 3.5.5. 
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Although this section was designed to apply only to operational requirement dismissals 
falling under section 189A, it has become a law of general application to any dismissal 
for operational requirement.395 Despite these statutory efforts, the law on substantive 
fairness in operational requirements dismissal has remained a challenge to the courts.  
4.1.2 Case Law Findings  
In assessing the substantive fairness in dismissal for operational requirements, it is the 
findings of this mini-thesis that the LC & LAC’s approach in dealing with this ingredient 
of dismissal has not been unanimous and coherent.  
This mini-thesis therefore found that the case law approach has remained split between 
abstention and intervention in scrutinising the employer’s rationale for dismissal. The 
abstention and intervention approach highlighting the court’s inconsistency for more 
than two decades is set out briefly in the following selected cases as discussed in detail 
in the previous chapters. 
The following selected cases were decided based on the abstentionist approach: 
Morester Bande (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & another;396 NUMSA 
v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd.397 Abstention after the coming into force of the 
current LRA include decisions such as Van Rensberg v Austen Safe & Co;398 Benjamin 
& Others v Plessey Tellumat SA (Pty) Ltd;399 SACTWU v Discreto;400 SACWU & others 
                                                            
395 See above at 3.5.5. 
396 (1990) 11 ILJ 687 (LAC). See above at 2.6. 
397 (1992) 13 ILJ 405 (IC). See above at 2.6. 
398 (1998) 1 BLLR 86 (LC). See above at 3.6. 
399 (1998) 19 ILJ 595 (LC). See above at 3.6. 
400 (1998) 19 ILJ 1451 (LAC). See above at 3.7.  
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v Afrox (Pty) Ltd;401 Steyn & Others v Driefontein Consolidated Ltd t/a West 
Driefontein;402 BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU403 and Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v 
NUMSA & Others.404  After the 2002 amendment to the LRA, the LAC in Mazista Tiles 
(Pty) Ltd v NUM & Others405 adopted the abstentionist approach. 
The intervention approach was adopted in the following decisions: NUMSA v Atlantis 
Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd,406 decided under the LRA of 1956. Intervention after the 
coming into the force of the current LRA and the amendment in 2002 include decisions 
such as Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd;407  County Fair 
Foods (Pty) Ltd v OCGAWU & Others;408 FAWU v SA Breweries;409 General Foods 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v FAWU;410  and NUMSA & Others v Genlux Lighting (Pty) Ltd.411  
The cases outlined above showed the inconsistency in this area of the law despite the 
2002 amendment to the LRA. This is so because section 189A did not state that in 
considering the alternatives, the employer must choose the alternative that would 
minimise or avoid job losses. Consequent on this statutory indecisiveness, the court’s 
position and approach has remained uncertain.  
The uncertainty in this area of the law, apart from the lack of statutory clarity, is 
premised on the nature of the dismissal itself. The decision to dismiss for operational 
                                                            
401 (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). See above at 3.7.  
402 (2001) 22 ILJ 231 (LC). See above at 3.7. 
403 (2001) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC). See above at 3.7.  
404 (2003) 2 BLLR 140 (LAC). See above at 3.8.2.  
405 (2004) 3 BLLR 219 (LAC). See above at 3.8.2.  
406 (1993) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC). See above at 3.6.  
407 (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). See above at 3.8.1. 
408 (2003) 7 BLLR 647(LAC). See above at 3.8.2.  
409 (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC). See above at 3.8.2.  
410 (2004) 7 BLLR 667 (LAC). See above at 3.8.2. 
411 (2009) 30 ILJ 654 (LC). See above at 3.8.2.  
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requirements is basically economic and not a legal one412 and judicial officers adopted 
the view that they were not necessarily the best qualified people to assess the merits of 
business decisions.413 While section 189A may have to an extent put an end to the 
showing deference approach mentioned above, there is a need for further amendment 
to bring the law of the substantive fairness for operational requirements into certainty.  
In view of both statutory and judicial uncertainty, the following recommendations 
calculated to help lessen this statutory inadequacy and case law uncertainty and bring 
this angle of the law towards some sort of equilibrium. 
4.2 Recommendations  
4.2.1 Statutory Recommendations  
Having assessed the statutory history in the substantive fairness of operational 
requirement dismissal and the inadequacy of the current statute in force today, it is 
recommended that the following provisions of the LRA be amended as follows: 
1. That the definition of operational requirements as enshrined in section 213 of the 
LRA be amended to exclude economic and similar needs of the employer.414 
It is recommended that section 213 should read as follows; 
“Operational requirements are requirements based on the financial necessity, 
technological and structural needs of the employer.”  
                                                            
412  Thompson C ‘Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirement Dismissal’ (1999) 
20 ILJ 755 at 760.  
413  Todd C & Damant G ‘Unfair Dismissal-Operational Requirements’ (2004) 25 ILJ 896 at 901. 
414 Maenetjie NH ‘Consultation Versus Negotiation in Operational Requirement Dismissals: The COSATU 
Proposal’ (2000) 21 ILJ 1526 at 1532.  
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There are two reasons for this recommendation. The first reason is to stem out 
dismissal for profits as a valid reason to justify dismissal for operational requirements. 
This recommendation is not against employers making profit, but that corporate profit 
cannot come at the expense of the very employees who to an extent are the 
contributors of the same profit. Hence, if financial necessity replaces economic needs in 
the definition of operational requirements under section 213 of the LRA, the platform to 
justify dismissal in order to increase profit will be removed.415 Employers must therefore 
craft other means to increase profit without taking from the employees their means of 
survival which in this case is their jobs. 
Secondly, the concept of ‘similar needs’ in the definition of operational requirements has 
to be deleted in order to bring consistency in this area of the law.416 This concept has 
brought in a lot of complication in its application.417 It has enable employers to attempt 
to justify retrenchment decisions with it, in that if it is not economic, technological or 
structural, the employer would always seek validation on the need to retrench on ‘similar 
needs’ of the business. It has even blurred the dividing lines between dismissal for 
operational requirement and the other two forms of dismissals.418  
2. That section 189A and section 189A(19) be amended: 
Secondly, it is recommended that section 189A(19)(c) be amended to include a 
provision that reads as follows: ‘The alternative chosen must be the one that minimises 
                                                            
415 Ibid.  
416 Ibid.  
417 See above at 3.4.  
418 See above at 3.4.2. 
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or avoids job losses.’419 This should be so because of the impact or the debilitating 
effect that job losses bring to employees and their families. While this recommendation 
does not in any way profess an indefinite employment or a discouragement for 
employers to hire more employees, it simply advocates labour justice by denying 
employers the liberty to see employees as disposable items especially in profit oriented 
dismissals. The amendment of operational requirements as defined in section 213, 
removal of ‘similar needs’ in the definition and the amendment of section 189A and 
section 189A(19) might help lessen the inconsistency in this area of the law.  
4.2.2 Recommendations to the Courts 
This mini-thesis has shown that showing deference to the employer’s rationale to 
dismiss for operational requirement never abated, even after 2002, because some 
decisions made after the 2002 amendment were still characterised by showing 
deference to the employer’s rationality to dismiss.420  
In the event that the statutory recommendations above are implemented, there need not 
be any recommendation to the courts. In the event that the statutory recommendations 
are not implemented, it is recommended that, to achieve some certainty in the 
adjudication of the substantive fairness in dismissal operational requirements, the court 
should adopt the approach of full scrutiny.  
The much needed certainty in this area of the law will be beneficial to both employers 
and employees. Employers will know when to retrench and when not to retrench for 
                                                            
419 Enterprise Food (Pty) Ltd v Allen & Others (2004) 25 ILJ 1251 (LAC) para 17.  
420 See the abstention approach in Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v NUM & Others (2005) 3 BLLR 219 (LAC) 
above at 3.8.2.  
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operational reasons because there will be certainty of the verdict that awaits a dismissal 
which falls short of a consistent approach. Employees will enjoy a better job security 
because their livelihoods are better protected due to the consistency in the law. 
Consistency in this area of the law will also reduce the workload in the LC and LAC in 
that less cases will be litigated because employers and employees know exactly what to 
expect in a legal proceeding before the court due to the certainty of the law.    
If the Algorax’s ‘measure of last resort’ approach was predicated on the massive job 
losses prevailing in 2003, it will be very relevant now given that the situation today is no 
different or maybe worse than then. With the rampant labour strikes in the country from 
the government sector, the farms and especially in the mining sector, this area of the 
law needs certainty. In the context of the regular strikes in South Africa and 
retrenchment possibilities especially in the mining sector, this mini-thesis recommends a 
full intervention approach to the courts when adjudicating the substantive fairness in 
dismissal for operational requirements along the lines of Algorax. However, while 
Algorax’s position is that the dismissal must be a ‘measure of last resort’, this mini-
thesis recommends instead that, for a dismissal for operational requirement to be fair, 
the alternative selected by an employer contemplating retrenchment must be the one 
with the minimum job losses possible.  
The recommendations proposed in this mini-thesis are designed to help bring the law of 
substantive fairness in operational requirement dismissal into certainty so that the full 
meaning of fairness as stated in section 188 of the LRA becomes a practical reality for 
both employers and employees in South Africa.  
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